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THE CRIMINAL LAW OF MENTAL INCAPACITY
HELEN SILVING
The author is Professor of Law in the University of Puerto Rico. She is also Adviser to the
Legislative Penal Reform Commission of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.*
.x a previous article in this Journal, Professor Silving proposed a new test for exemption from
pultiv, ! responsibility by reason of mental incapacity. With that test as a starting point, she pre-
sents in this article a highly significant proposal for a total revision of the criminal law pertaining
to "insanity." Professor Silving calls for a complete reappraisal of the law's policies and procedures
with respect to the defense of insanity and the bar of "unfitness to proceed," as well as the system
of measures to be taken with respect to persons acquitted by reason of mental incapacity or found
unfit to proceed in a criminal trial. The statutory scheme which the author proposes takes account
of psychiatric learning pertaining to mental illness as well as constitutional limitations upon the
measures the state may take in restricting the freedom of mentally ill persons who commit criminal
acts.-EDrOR.
Redefining the mental incapacity exemption
is but a partial problem of a much broader task,
that of revising the total area of the criminal law
of so-called "insanity." In the fields of procedure
and of the measures to be applied to persons "ac-
quitted by reason of insanity" conservatism, on
the one hand, and lack of realism and consistency,
on the other hand, have been as marked as in the
field of the exemption criterion. The same is true
of the law of "unfitness to proceed." All these
segments of the "law of insanity" require syste-
matic treatment. Such treatment ought to con-
sist of a rational evaluation of our present dis-
parate rules pertaining to the phenomenon of
mental incapacity in all its criminal law phases
and aspects, formulation of new realistic rules,
and their concordance and consolidation into a
consistent scheme oriented to a sound policy.
It is the purpose of this paper to present such
scheme of a "criminal law of mental incapacity."
In previous publications the writer has sub-
mitted a test of exemption from punitive responsi-
bility by reason of mental incapacity at the time
of, and for some time prior to, engagement in the
criminal conduct charged.' That test reads thus:
* The opinions expressed in this article are solely
those of the author; they are not meant to reflect the
views of the Legislative Penal Reform Commission
or of any Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.
I Silving, .Pschoanalysis and the Criminal Law,
51 J. Caum. L., C. & P. S. 19, 29 (1960); on the revised
version, quoted here in the text, see Silving, Mental
Incapacity in Criminal Law, in CuRRENT LAW AND
SOCIAL PROBrMS 3, 86 (Macdonald ed. 1961).
"No punishment shall be imposed upon a per-
son if at the time of engaging in criminal con-
duct and for some time prior thereto his ego
functioning was so impaired that he had a very
considerably greater mental difficulty in com-
plying with social demands and rules than does
the majority of the members of the commun-
ity."2
The writer believes that this test presents sev-
eral advantages. It is not but a remnant of an
ancient policy geared to the defense of error of law
rather than to that of mental deviation, as is Mc-
Naghten's test, nor a reflection of a preconceived
naively realistic notion of an immanent exempting
quality "of "mental disease" that "produces"
crime, as is the Durham test. 3 Nor does it incor-
porate, as do the Model Penal Code tests,4 a
"free will" formula, which-however meritorious
2By "community" is meant the population of the
district from which, in the event of jury trial, a jury is
drawn, provided that in determining whether the
actor's ego functioning was impaired special attention
ought to be given to the comparative ego functioning
of members of particular groups to which the actor
belongs, such as his social, educational, professional,
religious, or other groups.
3 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep.
718 (1843); Durham v. United States, 84 U. S. App.
D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954). For a critique of these
tests, see Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law,
supra note 1, at 30-43, 66-69.
4 MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955, and Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961). The
reference in the text is to the principal test and alter-
native (a) of the Tentative Draft. The Final Draft
adopted the principal test with some modifications.
See Final Draft, at 4.
HELEN SILVING
its metaphysical corollary may be-is not opera-
tional in practical context.' The quoted test
proceeds from fundamentals of criminal law, the
doctrine of punishment. The assumption is made
that exemption from punishment ought to be con-
ceded in situations to which the policy of punish-
ment is inapplicable. The general purpose of
punishment, in the opinion of the writer, is docu-
mentation of community prohibitions of rela-
tive gravity.6 Application of punishment is justi-
fied by the actor's "guilt," which in a democratic
society consists in imputation of responsibility
for violation of the citizenship duty of abidance
by community rulesY Such imputation is not
warranted unless the actor is an average com-
munity member, with a view to whom laws are
made. Accordingly, an exemption ought to be
granted to the non-average, that is, a person
whose psychic organization deviates consider-
ably from that of the majority of community
members. This test is relative in a dual sense.
It takes account of the fact that mental deviation
is not an absolute category, but is a departure
from the socially normal in mental life, making
the individual concerned appear "insane" to
others, so that he is "insane in relation to others."
It also reflects the notion that mental incapacity
is susceptible of gradation. Hence, the exemption
criterion is formulated in comparative terms and
indicates the degree of departure from the "nor-
mal" that qualifies for exemption. In this test
psychiatry plays not a primary but only a deriva-
tive role. Its function within the operation of
the test is appropriate to the needs of the de-
l Lack of "substantial capacity to conform [one's]
conduct to the requirements of law" means in the last
analysis "could not, substantially, have acted other-
wise than he did act." This posits the issue of "free
will." Of course, it is one thing to assume a philosophical
position of "free will" as justifying punitive state
intervention in principle and an entirely different thing
to attempt "proving" by legal methods that a given
individual did or did not possess "free will." Such proof
is as impossible as was proof that Ballard did not shake
hands with Christ or take dictation from Him in
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See
Silving, The Unknown and the Unknowable in Law,
35 CALIF. L. RIv. 352 (1947).
6 See Silving, "Rule of Law" in Criminal Justice, in
EssAys IN CRIMrINAL SCIENCE 77, 84-89 (Mueller ed.
1961).
7 See Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law,
supra note 1, at 23-24.
8 "Mental disease" indicates alteration of an indi-
vidual's internal status "vis i. vis his external world
as interpreted by others." RocHE, TnE CRIMINAL
MIND 15 (1958). Robinson Crusoe could not con-
ceivably be insane.
scribed criminal law policy. But the psychiatric
reference terms used in the test have been chosen
with a view to conveying meaning to psychia-
trists. While disagreement over the scope of these
terms is not excluded, the test reflects the chosen
policy, which may help to specify its meaning.
Of course, the mental incapacity exemption as
conceived in the recommended test is very broad,
meaning that a large group of persons may be
expected to qualify within it for exemption from
punitive responsibility. This feature of thic test
may raise doubts in the minds of -rr. n- criminal
law students. Such doubts, howev, er, ou &-", ' be
evaluated not in isolation but ratner in the light
of the total criminal law scheme of which such
exemption is a functional part. Whether an ex-
emption from punitive responsibility ought to
be formulated in broad or narrow terms should
depend on the operational meaning of the exemp-
tion, the results which such exemption entails
in a given legal system. For an exemption from
responsibility cast in terms of 'a "definition" of
mental incapacity is not merely a cognitive state-
ment; it is, as any meaningful part of a statute or
code, a dispositive and not merely a descriptive
category, a norm rather than a scientific proposi-
tion, although the choice of such norm ought to
be made in the light of scientific insight. A defini-
tion of mental incapacity is analytically reducible
to a rule for the guidance of law enforcement
agencies, a legal provision instructing courts
what group of persons shall be selected by them
for distinctive treatment. Obviously, such selec-
tion 'ought to be rationally determined by the
nature of such treatment. Thus, how broadly a
mental incapacity exemption or a definition of
mental incapacity should be formulated ought to
depend in a sound policy scheme on the nature
and scope of the treatment of the mentally in-
capacitated. A narrow definition of mental in-
capacity carries the serious policy disadvantage of
compelling legislators to deal punitively with the
large group of persons falling within a border
area of sanity, so-called "abnormal" persons,
who are not comprised by the definition of the
"insane" or "mentally diseased or defective."
Thus, for example, the Model Penal Code 'im-
poses an "extended term," that is, aggravated
punishment, on "abnormal" offenders. 9 No ex-
planation is offered why it has been found appro-
9 MODEL PENAL CODE §7.03 (3) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1954; Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955; Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
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priate to deal with such persons punitively-
indeed with increased punitive severity, implying
a judgment of greater blameworthiness-rather
than curatively.
The suggested test of mental incapacity, how-
ever, as any test of exemption, calls for imple-
menting institutions and rules of evidence and
procedure adapted to the requirements of that
particular test. As a realistic criterion of the men-
tal incapacity exemption, it ought to be set within
a general framework of rational rules as regards
its allegation and proof. An important part of
the law governing mental incapacity as related
to the engagement in criminal conduct, i.e., the
so-called "incapacity to commit a crime" or
"incapacity at the time of the act," is the al-
legedly "procedural" notion of "unfitness to
proceed," since, paradoxical as this may seem,
effective assertion of the "mental incapacity ex-
emption" is predicated upon actual, realistic
"mental fitness" of the accused to assert and main-
tain against the prosecution's attacks his own
former incapacity. Finally, perhaps the most
significant aspect of the mental incapacity ex-
emption from punishment in modem times is the
scheme of "measures of security" to be applied to
persons acquitted by reason of "mental incapac-
ity." Similarly, a finding of "unfitness to proceed"
calls for application of rational discriminatory
"'measures."
Before discussing the several enumerated topics
it is necessary to emphasize certain basic assump-
tions made in this paper in accordance with policy
demands submitted by the writer in previous
publications.
A dual approach dividing criminal law state
intervention into "punishment," on the one hand,
and "measures," on the other hand, is advocated
for the purpose of avoiding confusion of the ends
pursued by law, with resulting injustice to the
individual. It is wrong to punish a person or to
.extend his punishment beyond the degree ade-
quate to his "guilt" on the ground that he is
"dangerous"; likewise, it is irresponsible on the
part of the State to let a "dangerous" person
continue endangering the community. To guaran-
tee individual freedom to the utmost possible
extent, state reaction to "guilt" and state reac-
tion to "danger" must be kept clearly distinct
and separate, so that any state organ, whether
legislative or judicial, may be able at any time
to answer the broad habeas corpus query, funda-
mental in a democracy: "Why do you restrain
this man's freedom?"'10
The "law of measures," as the "law of punish-
ment," is subject to principles of the "rule of law."
Measures ought to be governed by general legal
rules and administered by courts throughout
the period of state intervention. They must not
exceed in scope or duration "danger-adequate"
intervention, just as punishment ought not to
exceed "guilt-adequate" intervention. There
ought to be uniformity and continuity of policy
in criminal law administration from the initial
step taken with regard to an individual until the.
ultimate termination of all criminal law state
intervention into his life. Trial and sentence
ought to constitute a continuous process governed
by a clear and uniform policy. However, there
ought to be inserted between the trial stage, con-
cemed with the determination of "responsibility"
in principle, whether punitive or in measures,
and the sentencing stage, devoted to deciding
upon the exact terms of punishment or measures,
as the case may be, an investigative procedure
purported to provide the court with the necessary
scientific personality evaluation of the person
concerned. Such a scientific evaluation should
be made in a special Psychiatric and Sociological
Examination Center, should be based on veri-
fiable data rather than the gossip-type informa-
tion often supplied in probation reports, and
should be subject to legal scrutiny by the de-
fense in an adversary "sentencing trial." It thus
should afford a proper foundation for a just
sentence in a democratic society." But such evalu-
ation cannot be taken as the sole determinant of
disposition. Objective criteria are essential safe-
guards of personal liberty.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first
deals with problems arising prior to the sentencing
stage. One section thereof is devoted to discussion
of the rules of procedure and evidence applicable
in the process of determining mental incapacity
relating to engagement in the criminal conduct
10 "The great writ" has been often interpreted some-
what narrowly. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934);
Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 307 (1946); Parker v.
Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960); in Puerto Rico, Diaz v.
Campos, 81 D.P.R. 1009 (1960). It is nevertheless
susceptible of a broader interpretation, expressing a
philosophy of government that confers powers strictly
limited to precisely such intervention as is clearly
called for in the type of situation involved.
" For a critique of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949), see Silving, "Rule of Law" in Criminal
Juslice, supra note 6, at 78-89.
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charged; the second section is dedicated to evalua-
tion of the law of so-called "unfitness to proceed"
in its definitional and sanctioning aspects. The
second main part deals with the scheme of "meas-
ures" to be applied to persons "acquitted by
reason of mental incapacity."
I. PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE
"TRIAL STAGE"
A. PRocmupm To DETERPm MENTAL INCAPAc-
ITY RELATED TO ENGAGEMENT IN THE
CRIMINAL CoNDucT
(1) Who May Raise the Mental Ixapacity
Issue?
The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Inititute considered allowing the
trial judge to raise the defense of incapacity, but
rejected it on insufficient grounds. Section 4.03
declares "mental disease or defect excluding re-
sponsibility" to be "an affirmative defense."
In a comment to this provision 12 the draftsmen
explain that while giving the trial judge authority
to raise the issue of incapacity at the time of
crime was "considered desirable," "such provision
was finally omitted as being too great an inter-
ference with the conduct of the defense." But a
defendant's refusal to allow such issue to be raised
might, in the draftsmen's opinion, be weighed as a
factor in deciding whether he is mentally fit to
proceed. Of course, no weight whatever can be
attributed to such refusal in those, by no means
rare, cases in which raising the issue of mental
incapacity is undesirable in the objective self-
interest of the defendant, though desirable from
the standpoint of the community.
13
12MODE.L PENAL. CODE §4.03, comment at 194
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
13 In Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 392 (D.C.
Cir.), appeal pending, 366 U.S. 958 (1961), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, relied on the
Davis rule, Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895),
and held that "insanity is not strictly an affirmative
defense and can be raised by either the court or the
prosecution." The majority also inferred this rule from
"almost a positive duty on the part of the trial judge
not to impose a criminal sentence on a mentally ill
person." Id. at 393. In answer to the appellee's conten-
tion that he had carefully considered entering a plea
of guilty, with the advise of counsel, the majority
pointed out that "this decision was one which appellee
and his counsel did not have an absolute right to
make," in the light of the above cited duty of the
court. Judge Fahy, dissenting, id. 394, at 395, noticed
that the case presented "a serious question ... involv-
ing the right of a person accused of a misdemeanor,
who is competent to plead guilty and is represented by
counsel, not to be compelled by the court to enter a
It is an assumption based solely on historical
grounds that the trial judge's authority to raise
the issue of mental incapacity constitutes a
greater "interference with the conduct of the
defense" than does his power to inquire into the
question of crime commission or intent under a
general denial of guilt. The mental incapacity ex-
emption is by no means coextensive with the
absence of intent, since mental illness often re-
leases rather than inhibits intent; nevertheless
there may be sound policy reasons for treating
mental incapacity and absence of intent in a
plea of not guilty." But he found it unnecessary to
resolve "this most difficult question," since he con-
sidered "the commitment which eventuated from the
trial ... invalid for other reasons." It is instructive
to read the decision of the majority in the light of the
fact that for the purpose of a commitment in the Dis-
trict of Columbia after acquittal solely on the ground
of insanity, D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301 (Supp. 8 1960),
dangerousness of the defendant need not be proved,
and according to the dominant opinion, the purpose of
the commitment is treatment and not protection of
the community from danger. One might query whether
in a free society it is not better to impose punishment
upon a person not "guilty" because of insanity at the
time of the act, than to impose psychiatric treatment
against his will and without positive showing of mental
illness, where the charges against him were misdemea-
nors involving two checks of $50 each cashed on a
single day. For discussion of the impact of the auto-
matic detention provision on the burden of proof, see
United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23,39-40 (D.D.C.
1961).
In civil law countries courts have the authority and
the duty to raise the mental incapacity issue in appro-
priate cases. Among the countries of English legal
tradition, Israel has introduced a rule permitting the
court to raise such issue. Section 6 (b) of the Law Con-
cerning the Mentally Ill 1955, SEFER CnuEm 187. (of
6.7. 1955), P. 121, provides as follows:
"When a person is charged with crime and the
court finds that the accused committed the criminal
act with which he is charged but finds, either upon
evidence adduced by one of the parties or upon
evidence brought before it upon its own motion, that
the accused is not subject to punishment because he
was [mentally] ill at the time of the act and that he
still is [mentally] ill, the court shall order that he be
confined in a mental hospital."
Other pertinent provisions of the same law read thus:
"(c) An order of the court under subdivision (a)
[order for confinement in a hospital of a defendant
unfit to plead] or under subdivision (b) is for the
purpose of appeal deemed a judgment of conviction.
"(d) In order to make it possible for the court to
decide whether an order under this section is called
for, the court may order, upon motion of one of the
parties or upon its own motion, that the accused be
medically examined and, if necessary for the pur-
pose of examination, that he be confined in a hospital.
"(e) The order under this section shall be executed
by the District Psychiatrist .... " (Author's trans-
lation.)
Section 17 a) authorizes the Psychiatric Board to
release a person confined by virtue of section 6.
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similar manner procedurally. At law no factor
can be said to possess an immanent "defense"
status, as such status is conferred by law upon
certain factors, often on policy grounds. Whether
any given matter ought to be treated as an affirma-
tive defense or as part of the crime elements should
be determined functionally, in terms of the results
of alternative solutions.
Where mental incapacity is treated as an af-
firmative defense, the accused alone decides
whether the measures provided for those ac-
quitted by reason of insanity can be applied to
him, even though these measures presumably
are primarily means of community protection.
The crucial problem is hence to determine whether
it is sound criminal law policy to confer such power
of decision upon the accused. It may, of course, be
proper in some situations but. not in others. In
such cases there is a conflict between the public
interest in community protection and the indi-
vidual interest in freedom to choose limited im-
prisonment in preference to a potentially longer
detention in a mental hospital; a democratic solu-
tion is predicated upon comparison of the weight
of the pertinent interests in differential situations.
Whether the court and prosecution should have
the authority to raise the issue of mental incapac-
ity should be viewed not in isolation but rather
in the light of the scope of the definition of "men-
tal incapacity," the bearing of such definition on
the issue of "dangerousness," and the relation of
the nature and gravity of the crime charged to
that issue. The public interest in protection rises
with increasing scope of the mental incapacity
exemption, but not necessarily proportionately,
since the added incapacity situations involve
less serious mental deviations. And none of the
known definitions of "mental incapacity" has a
clear bearing on "dangerousness." However,
the nature and gravity of the act charged may be
assumed to be an indicium of the actor's "danger-
.ousness." The type of crime in issue affords both
an objective and a general standard- of dangerous-
ness and, for the purpose of determining the scope
of court authority with a fair degree of precision,
these features of objectivity and generality are
significant enough to override the consideration
that the gravity of the precipitating crime is not
the only test of dangerousness.
It may not be desirable to expose a person who
engaged in conduct which, given the required state
of mind, would at most constitute a misdemeanor
and thus presumably does not present a grave
social danger to the involved operation of the
scheme of mental incapacity measures unless he
himself chooses this alternative in preference to
punishment. Moreover, the treatment of mental
incapacity is usually lengthy and would be dis.
proportionate to the seriousness of either the
disease or the criminal act committed. The imposi-
tion of time limitations upon criminal law meas-
ures where the precipitating crime is minor might
render effective functioning of the system of
mental incapacity measures illusory. Thus, in
cases involving misdemeanors "mental incapac-
ity" should remain an "affirmative defense"
which only the accused can raise. But in felony
cases, in which by hypothesis a serious harm has
been caused, so that there is some indication of
danger of similar harm in the future, the state has
the duty to take steps for the protection of the
community. In felony cases the public interest
in protection overrides the pertinent individual
interest. Hence, in such cases courts and the prose-
cution should have the power to raise the issue of
''mental incapacity."
An intricate problem may arise in a trial of a
misdemeanor case when the evidence abundantly
shows that the defendant suffered from a mental
incapacity when he committed the act charged,
but he refuses to raise the issue of such incapacity.
To resolve this problem, it is necessary to consider
the significance or purpose of requiring that an
issue be "raised" by the accused in a criminal
trial. The core of our philosophy of criminal
procedure, the adversary nature of our criminal
trial, would seem to be at stake. Yet, it is possible
to argue even within this philosophy that the
requirement that a party should "raise an issue,"
other than one involving a new offense, is simply
a means of limiting the process of evidence and
proof and a means of affording the parties an
opportunity of controverting adverse evidence.
Taking judicial notice of an obvious fact is hardly
"inquisitorial." When evidence, indeed over-
whelming proof of a fact, becomes available inci-
dentally, it would be a distortion of justice and
prejudicial to public faith in its administration
were the court forced to render a judgment which
it knows to be dearly inappropriate, in the sense
of violating the avowed policy of the law. Of
course, the defendant's civil liberties must be
safeguarded; he must have an opportunity to
controvert the evidence of mental incapacity,
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and the measure to be imposed in the case of ac-
quittal by reason of mental incapacity must be
limited to the same maximum as is imposed upon
the punishment for the criminal conduct in which
he engaged.
Where the court and the prosecution are au-
thorized to raise both the issue of "mental in-
capacity related to the criminal act" and that of
"fitness to proceed"-they may raise the latter
under conventional law-, the question is posed:
How does the court or the prosecutor come to
suspect that the defendant may not be "fit to
proceed" or may have committed the criminal
act in a state of incapacity? This brings us to the
second point of importance: At what stage and
by whom should the mental state of a defendant
be examined?
(2) Bases of Doubt Regarding Mental Capacity
or Fitness To Proceed
The view that lay persons are as qualified as
psychiatrists to testify to "mental incapacity"
is no longer supported by anyone except certain
of our legal authorities. 14 Courts in foreign coun-
tries have emphatically rejected it.15 The behavior
patterns from which laymen commonly infer
absence of mental incapacity, particularly calm-
ness after crime commission and rationality, have
been shown not to constitute proof of mental
health. The first mentioned phenomenon has
been pointed out by psychiatrists to suggest an
exactly opposite inference.16 In fact, not even a
"1 On this see OvxorEOLsER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND
THE LAw 111-12 (1953).
15n Germany the Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Civil
and Criminal Matters), implying that on any question
of psychological evaluation experts are better qualified
than laymen, reversed a conviction for a sex offense
because the trial court found it unnecessary to hear
experts concerning the trustworthiness of the testi-
mony of a child seven years old. 7 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen 82 (V. Strafsenat),
Dec. 14, 1954. The court said at 83-85: "There is
general agreement concerning the fact that there are
means of arriving at the truth that are available to the
medical expert and, according to some authorities also
to the psychological expert, but are not available to
the court, at any event during trial ... ." The court
did not refer to any special tests, such as narcoanalysis
or lie-detectors, which are prohibited in Germany. It
referred simply to psychiatric and psychological knowl-
edge and experience, as contrasted with the crude psy-
chology of lay interrogators.
'6 Guttmacher, Criminal Responsibility in Certain
Homicide Cases Involving Family Members, in PsYcHIA-
TRY AND THE LAW 73, 91 (Hoch & Zubin ed. 1955),
observed that of the 36 cases examined by him per-
sonally in the Medical Office of the Supreme Bench of
psychiatrist is qualified to testify to the mental
state of a person unless he has adequately ex-
amined him27 Only in certain situations is mental
disease so obvious as to arouse immediate sus-
picion even in the mind of a layman. Since the
court's superficial observations are not sufficient
to insure the spotting of all defendants who may
not be fit to proceed or who may have committed
the felonious act charged in a state of incapacity,
some other method must be adopted to assure
Baltimore, Md., "Most of the psychotic individuals
showed little affective reaction to the homicides."
But courts take no notice of such scientific findings.
Pueblo v. Sinchez, 79 D.P.R. 116 (1956), is an
instructive case. The accused, when told that his cows
which were illegally grazing on the campus of the Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico were seized by the guards, in a
fit of blind rage purposely ran over with his jeep one
of the guards and killed another by hitting him over
the head with a tube. A few minutes later he was found
by a policeman when, tube in hand, he tried to stop
passing cars. When asked to explain his conduct,
S6inchez immediately answered: "I killed two persons
and wish to surrender." He then asked the policeman
to take him to the police station at Hato Rey and not
to that of Rio Piedras, because-he said-in Rio
Piedras the police would kill him. On the way to the
police station he said: "I killed these impudent fellows;
they will no longer abuse me, abusing me is finished."
The evidence submitted in support of the defense of
insanity consisted of proof of (1) hereditary factors,
(2) specific conduct pointing to insanity, (3) expert
testimony, and (4) the manner in which the crime
occurred. Proof was adduced that three brothers of
the accused were confined in a mental institution, two
of them suffering from schizophrenia and the third
from oligophrenia; that three paternal uncles had
committed suicide and that the accused's father had
attempted a suicide. It was shown that both before
and after commission of the crime the accused on
various occasions engaged in soliloquy, cried without
motive, unexpectedly left his work, bit the muzzle of
a cow because she hit him with her tail, suddenly
started running without reason, attacked his friends
in the course of debates, and attempted suicide. Not-
withstanding all this evidence, the Supreme Court held
that the jury was justified in finding the accused sane,
since his own wife had testified that he was well for
periods of months; since his request that he be taken
to the Hato Rey station for fear that they might kill
him in Rio Piedras showed that he could reason ration-
ally; and since the prosecutor who questioned him
testified that he was calm and serene at the Hato Ray
station, answered questions correctly, and showed no
sign of incoherence, so that the prosecutor never
doubted his sanity.
The writer and a group of law students spoke to
Sinchez at the penitentiary where he is serving his life
sentence. He was placed in the psychiatric wing of the
institution. He answered a student's question as to the
motive of his action saying that he was not responsible
for this action; rather, it was all his brother's fault,
since his brother was responsible for everything bad
that ever happened in the world.
1 This has been recognized by the MODEL PENAL
CODE §4.07 (3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955; Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
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that no injustice is done due to inadequate safe-
guards.
The Model Penal Code provides for psychia-
tric examination in advance of trial only in cases
where either "the defendant has filed a notice of
intention to rely on the defense of mental disease
dr defect excluding responsibility" or "there is
reaion to doubt his fitness to proceed, or reason to
believe thiat mental disease or defect of the de-
fendant will otherwise become an issue in the
cause."' 8 In those situations in which the issue
of "mental illness" may or, indeed, must be raised
by the court,19 it is obviously pertinent to inquire:
Whence comes the doubt that the defendant does
not now or did not at the crucial time possess the
required capacity? If doubt must arise before an
examination is ordered, the principal source of
protection of both the defendant and the com-
munity is unreliable lay hunches. Hence, there is a
dear need for a procedure of advance examination
of a defendant, at least in all felony cases, a pro-
cedure in the nature of that conducted under the
Briggs Law of Massachusetts.20
The Briggs Law provides for a preliminary ex-
amination of persons "indicted by a grand jury
for a capital offense or... known to have been
indicted for any other offense more than once or
to have been previously convicted of a felony."
The clerk of the court or the trial justice gives
notice to the Department of Mental Health, and
the Commissioner of Mental Health thereupon
appoints two impartial experts'to examine the
person concerned. The practice is to appoint only
diplomates of the American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology for such examinations. 21 A report
is filed and made available to the court, the prose-
cution, and the defense. The report itself is not
admissible in evidence, but the psychiatrists who
prepared it may be called as witnesses."
It is submitted that a preliminary examination
should be limited to situations in which the pre-
cipitating crime is a felony. In misdemeanor cases
"8Id. §4.05 (1).19People v. Burson, 11111. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239
(1957); State v Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50, 69
(1959). For discussion of the virtually unlimited
manner in which the present mental condition of the
defendant may be introduced into a criminal trial, see
Note, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of Particular
Justice, 71 YALE L. J. 109, 123 & nf. 76 & 77 (1961).
20 MAss. Awx. LAws c. 123, §100 A (Supp. 1955).
21 See Flower, The Psychiatric Examination of Offend-
ers in Massach"usells, in PSYcmATRx AND T LAW,
97, 102 (Hoch & Zubin ed. 1955).
22See OVERHOISER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 120-25.
it should be ordered only if the defendant requests
such examination. The practice of bringing to the
attention of the court the presence of an issue
of recidivism in advance of determination of the
defendant's guilt of the precipitating crime is
highly prejudicial to him. Treatment of a "re-
peated offense" as a procedural unit interferes
with independent evaluation of the evidence
regarding the precipitating crime, for there is a
general tendency, not only of the jury but of the
court as well, to assume guilt when it becomes
known that the defendant has committed a crime
before. It may not be possible to prevent knowl-
edge of the court from being conveyed to the
jury by various methods of unconscious com-
munication in a trial. Still there is an undoubted
interest that the defendant be given an oppor-
tunity to defend himself against the charge of
recidivism; moreover, in recidivism cases there is a
great likelihood of a mental incapacity background,
so that it is most desirable that the defendant in
such cases be psychiatrically examined. These
conflicting interests can be reconciled. Recidivism
should not be permitted to be mentioned at all
until after conviction for the crime that gives
rise to the proceedings. Only after conviction
should the court be given information regarding
prior convictions. Recidivism then becopnes an
issue for the purpose of sentencing, which, as
suggested, should be the subject of a separate
adversary hearing before court and jury. Prior
to that hearing there ought to be a mandatory
examination in the Psychiatric and Sociologic
Examination Center to determine whether the
crime repetition has a mental disease back-
ground." If it does, the conviction based on the
assumption that the accused was not mentally
incapacitated at the time of crime commission
should be revoked and an acquittal by reason of
mental incapacity entered, so that measures
rather than punishment become applicable.
As is well known, examination may often re-
2 Compare Silving, "Rule of Law" in Criminal
Justice, supra note 6, at 142, 150.
In our law there is at present a conflict of views in
different jurisdictions on the question whether the
interest in alleging prior convictions in indictments
and informations, such allegations being a condition
of the certainty of charges or dictated by treatment
of recidivism as an independent crime type, overrides
the need for protection of the defendant against the
prejudicial effect of knowledge of prior convictions on
the part of fact finders. On this conflict and the various
methods of reconciling both interests see 42 C.J.S.,
Indictments and Informations §145, at 1057-1062
(1944 and Supp. 1961).
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quire confinement in a mental hospital. Such
detention of a person presumed innocent may
raise constitutional questions, and it should
certainly not be prolonged beyond necessity.
Hence, every effort should be made to avoid it
unless dearly shown to be necessary, and where
it is necessary, to reduce the time of detention
to'a minimum. In some cases there is no need
for a protracted process of examination. And the
period of examination should be extended only
for reasons involving persons engaged in legal
proceedings. It is hence suggested that a psy-
chiatric clinic be made available in which crimi-
nal cases are given preference. Confinement in a
mental hospital should be imposed only if the
clinic psychiatrists find that ambulatory ex-
amination appears insufficient. Where confine-
ment is necessary, the maximum period should
be fixed at a low point, for example, ten days,
with the proviso that the court may extend it
for additional ten day periods, but not beyond a
maximum of, e.g., 60 days. Bail should be granted
only subject to conformance to examination re-
quirements.
The court should have discretionary power to
24 The issue of constitutionality of a court order for
a psychiatric examination of the defendant has been
argued for a long time, but the dominant view today
is that such an officially imposed examination is con-
stitutional. Jessner v. State, 22 Wis. 184, 231 N.W.
634 (1930); State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d
506, 507, 32 A.L.R.2d 430 (1951), and cases cited by
the court; State v. Livingston, 105 S.E.2d 73, 79
(S.C. Sup. Ct. 1958); State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d
746, 750-51 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959). See also MODEL
PEnAL CODE §4.05, comment at 195-96 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955) (list of statutes providing for pre-trial
examination of a defendant's mental capacity). For a
recent case holding constitutional pre-arraignment men-
tal examinations by the people without equal opportu-
nity of the accused, not represented by counsel, see
Early v. Tinsley, 265 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied
364 U.S. 847 (1960).
Certain justifications and reservations advanced by
courts in this context are clearly rationalizations. Thus,
for example, waiver of the privilege against self-in-
crimination is inferred from a prospective plea of
insanity. State v. Myers, supra, 67 S.E.2d at 507-08;
State v. Swinburne, supra at 750-51; Early v. Tinsley,
supra. There is a touch of Miinchhausen argumentation
in the court's contention in the last cited case, at 2-3,
that a defendant whose mental incapacity is in issue
can waive his privilege against self-incrimination by
voluntarily and knowingly submitting to the examina-
tion, as well as in the contention that as regards such
person the examination was not deceitful. If the
defendant turns out to be mentally ill, he cannot
validly waive any privilege and the examination as
regards such person is necessarily "deceitful." The
realistic ground on which such examination may be
ordered is the necessity of determining whether the
person concerned is fit to proceed and the great public
appoint two qualified psychiatrists to examine the
defendant and report the results of such examina-
tion, as a substitute for referral to the clinic or
hospital. Such an appointment should particu-
larly be made in a misdemeanor case where the
defendant asks for a preliminary examination.
Whether the official examination is made by
clinic, hospital, or specially appointed psychia-
trists, the defendant should have the right to be
examined by one or two psychiatrists of his own
choice, as well. Furthermore, he should have
the right to request that a consultation be held
between the official psychiatrists and the psy-
chiatrist or psychiatrists of his choice. This is to
avoid so far as feasible any differences in the
reports that are not truly meaningful, such as
mere diversity of terminology, which might con-
fuse the trial participants. If, as a result of such
consultation, an agreement can be reached upon a
diagnosis, a joint report ought to be filed. In such
case there is no need to expose the defendant to a
cumbersome hearing on the issue of incapacity,
unless he insists upon it. Hence, on the basis of a
joint report, the court should have the power to
find the defendant (a) either fit or unfit to proceed;
(b) not guilty by reason of insanity, provided
in this instance that commission of the criminal
act is admitted. If no agreement is reached,
separate reports ought to be filed with the court.
If the disagreement concerns fitness to proceed, a
hearing must be held, for which either party and/or
the court may require any or all of the psychia-
trists who filed reports to appear and submit to
cross-examination. The court ought to have
authority to call additional psychiatrists. If the
disagreement concerns capacity at the crucial
interest in ascertaining impartially whether he should
be subject to punishment or to measures, if it be found
that he committed the act charged.
As will later be seen, the defendant should be given
an opportunity from the very outset to be examined
by a psychiatrist or psychiatrists of his choice. Other
safeguards must be afforded, so that a device of neces-
sity might not be extended beyond an unavoidable
minimum intervention into human freedom.
As pointed out in Jessner v. State, supra, 231 N.W. at
636, if any violation of the constitutional rights of an
accused is authorized by a statute providing for a pre-
trial examination, "It must be ascribed to the provision
which authorizes his commitment to a hospital of the
insane for the purposes of observation ...." But, in
the light of the intricacy of the issue of incapacity in
certain cases, such commitment may be an indispens-
able condition of effective performance of the diagnostic
task. Yet such commitment, being a necessity device,
should not be prolonged beyond the limits imposed by
necessity.
[Vol. 53
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF MENTAL INCAPACITY
time, or if commission of the criminal act is not
admitted, a trial must be held. At such trial any
or all of the psychiatrists who submitted reports
should be available to testify and to submit to
cross-examination. Either party and/or the court
should be able to call additional experts, subject
to the court's power to limit their number. Clearly,
all reports filed must be made available to both
the prosecution and the defense.
(3) Evidence of Mental Incapacity at the
Trial Levd
The recommended test of "mental incapacity"
related to engagement in the criminal conduct
charged is complex and may call for presentation
of a combination of evidentiary material. It is
"culture oriented," meaning that the mental
state of the accused must be evaluated in relation
to that which is normal in a given community.
A double proof must be adduced: that of the
mental state of the accused, and that of the
mental state of his environment, i.e., of the "com-
munity" to which he belongs, including the group
or groups, within the district in which he lives,
of which he is a member. Thus, psychiatrists
alone may be unable to supply the necessary
evidence. Other persons acquainted with the
beliefs, customs, reactions, and expectations of
the relevant "community" may be called upon to
supply the necessary information. As to such
sociological matters, sociologists may qualify as
experts. Also, any persons belonging to the. com-
munity may be permitted to testify as regards its
beliefs, customs, and expected conduct.
As suggested before, however, laymen are not
equipped to express opinions on the mental state
of the accused. They should not be permitted to
testify, for example, that the accused appeared
to them to be of sound or of unsound mind, for
they do not as a general rule possess the scientific
knowledge necessary to evaluate or interpret
conduct in terms of psychiatric categories. They
should be permitted to testify in descriptive
terms as to the manner in which the accused
behaved before, during, or after the act, provided
that a psychiatrist supplies information regarding
the relevance and psychiatric import of such be-
havior under the circumstances. Should a layman
testify to conduct or other matters the relevance
of which has not been proved, the jury should
be instructed to ignore such testimony in reaching a
decision as to the mental state in issue.25
As regards the mental state of the accused
psychiatric and, in some types of cases, psycho-
logical testimony is of the essence. But a psychia-
trist or psychologist should be permitted to give his
opinion regarding the accused's state of mind
only if he has examined the accused. A psychia-
trist or a psychologist may also testify on general
propositions of psychiatric or psychological science,
and on the issue of the validity of the procedure
followed, or the general scientific propositions
stated, by another witness. 6
An expert should be allowed to testify freely,
and so far as possible without interruption. He
should be permitted to present, in the form of his
choice, as comprehensive a picture of the ac-
cused's state of mind as possible, and to refer to
episodes of the accused's life which do not neces-
sarily on superficial observation appear pertinent'
to the state of mind relative to the act charged.n
25 In United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23, 40-41
(D.D.C. 1961), Judge Holtzoff cited cases in which the
United States Supreme Court held that a layman may
express an opinion based on his own observations as
to whether a person is of sound or unsound mind, and
cited the observation of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in Attorney-General for the State of
South Australia v. Brown, [1960] A.C. 432, 452, that
"The previous and contemporaneous acts of the accused
may often be preferred to medical theory;" Judge
Holtzoff then concluded that "lay testimony on the
issue of insanity may be of two kinds: opinions of lay
witnesses based on their own observations; and evi-
dence of the previous and contemporaneous acts of
the accused." The latter is adopted as acceptable in
the text; however the authoritative views cited by
Judge Holtzoff as well as his subsequent reliance on
the rationality of the accused's condu~ct are submitted
to be open to doubt.
In -sum, my submission is that a layman may testify
as to (1) what are the beliefs, customs and expectations
prevailing in the community to which he belongs; (2)
what he saw or heard the accused do or say prior to,
during, or after the act. In testifying to beliefs, customs
and expectations prevailing in the community, of
course, a layman is interpreting the states of mind of
community members. However, such interpretations
differ from interpretation of the state of mind of an
individual, in that they actually but reflect matters of
common knowledge within the community. It is also
true that every description of conduct implies an inter-
pretation, and to this extent a lay testimony regarding
the accused's conduct may include elements of psy-
chiatric evaluation. However, certain limitations on
the descriptiveness of testimony are implied in the
nature of language as the medium of testimonial evi-
dence.26 On the last point see MODEL PENAL CODE §4.07(3), end of last sentence (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1961).
27 The Socratic method of elucidation of truth by a
process of question and answer directed to specific
19621
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The expert should be interrupted only if he testi-
fies in an inadmissible manner or if it appears that
he is about to reveal inadmissible matters, such
as those bearing on commission of the act (if
the act is not admitted) or prior criminal conduct
of the accused. 28 Before testifying, he should be
points is not suitable as an initial method of inquiry
where the "truth" consists of a comprehensive existen-
tial reality rather than of a composite of mosaic-like
pieces. Questioning in such cases need'not be dispensed
with as a method of testing and checking upon the psy-
chiatrist's testimony, although one might consider
the possibility of calling upon another psychiatrist
rather than upon a lawyer to function as interrogator.
My submission is that the court should include an
associate judge who is a trained psychiatrist, and such
judge would be particularly qualified to pose any ques-
tions which a court might normally address to the
expert. The presence of a psychiatrist member of the
court ought to afford a safeguard against the kind of
double-talk now frequently encountered when law
and psychiatry clash on the forensic scene. On composi-
tion of courts see Silving, "Rule of Law" in Criminal
Justice, supra note 6, at 149.
Chief Judge Biggs, in United States v. Currens, 290
F.2d 751, 771-73 (3d Cir. 1961), rejected the Durham
formula, but expressed approval of its permitting the
psychiatrist to "give a picture of the whole man to the
court and jury" rather than restricting him to answer
specific questions. Id. at 771. But since Judge Biggs
did not question the present method of interrogating
the expert in our law, his remarks must be taken to
refer solely to the type of specific questions that may
be posed to the expert; thus, he was approving inter-
rogation directed not only to the "knowledge test"
(McNaghten), but to consideration of other mental fac-
tors as well.
28 While in many jurisdictions by statute informa-
tion acquired by a physician in attending a patient in a
professional capacity is privileged, see, for example,
Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir.
1955), doubt remains as to extension of a similar
privilege to the event where the physician has been
appointed by the court to examine the defendant.
See GUTTmAcHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAw 275-76 (1952). In England, according to these
authors, it seems to be considered unethical for the
examiner even to discuss the circumstances surrounding
the crime with the suspect, let alone to reveal his
statements to the authorities. It may be difficult to
visualize a full psychiatric examination in which a
particular topic is carefully avoided. But a rule barring
disclosure of any knowledge regarding commission of
the crime has been mentioned by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina in State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67
S.E.2d 506, 508 (1951). In the District of Columbia,
for example, the doctor-patient privilege bars disclosure
of matters regarding commission of the act in question,
but has been made specifically inapplicable "to evi-
dence relating to the mental competency or sanity of the
accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the
defense of insanity." (Emphasis supplied.) D.C. CODE
ANN. §14-308 (Supp. 8 1960). Under this provision,
can the prosecution or court comment upon a defend-
ant's refusal to cooperate in a court-ordered examina-
tion? Doubts have been expressed regarding the
propriety of such comments in light of the privilege
against self-incrimination where the issue is the defend-
ant's sanity, which at common law is an essential
instructed by the court as regards the type of
evidence that is inadmissible and admonished that
he must not, under sanction of contempt, dis-
dose any information he may possess that is pro-
tected by the rules on inadmissibility. After mak-
ing a comprehensive statement, the expert may
be questioned as to particular points and cross-
examined.
(4) Disposition and Remedies in Cases of
Mental Incapacity
Where a court or jury has rendered a verdict
of "not guilty by reason of mental incapacity,"
the court should assign the defendant to the special
Examination Center for a further examination
and report to assist the court in determining
whether any measures ought to be imposed and,
if so, what type or types of measures may be ap-
propriate to the case. As suggested before, such
assignment should also be required in cases of
conviction where upon a mandatory inquiry by
the court it is shown that the accused has been
convicted before.
component of mens rea. Krash, The Durham Rule and
Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the
District of Columbia, 70 YALE L. J. 905, 920 (1961).
The fact that sanity is a condition of mens rea for
purposes of conviction does not necessarily mean that
it must be treated in all respects in the same manner as
intent, negligence, or other components of mens rea.
Certainly, sanity has not been so treated for purposes
of the burden of proof at common law, under the rule
in McNaghten's Case, or under the law of several
American jurisdictions. Nor need it, as a matter of
Iogical necessity, be treated as is intent for the purpose
of the privilege against self-incrimination. There is a
difference between compelling a person to admit that
he intended to kill and requiring him to submit to a
psychiatric examination that might reveal that he was
sane at the time of the alleged killing, especially when
he cannot be compelled to utter words in the course of
the examination. But, viewed from a practical stand-
point, either the privilege or the full value of the
expert testimony as to mental capacity must be jeop-
ardized, for it is very difficult effectively to evaluate
the accused's mental state without revealing or hinting
at commission of an act that may have played an
important role in his life.
The realistic justification for admission of disclosure
of information regarding an accused's mental state by
the physician appointed by the court to examine him
lies in the overriding interest in the ascertainment of
such mental state by experts at a time when lay obser-
vations on the subject have been discredited. Expert
testimony on the issue of sanity is necessary, for without
it there could be no evidence sufficient to support a
verdict, either of conviction or of acquittal by reason
of mental incapacity. It is important to bear in mind
that in our times either course leads to state interven-
tion, so that the operational meaning of many of our
traditional legal principles, such as the presumption of
innocence and the presumption of sanity, has changed.
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Another adversary hearing ought to be held
on the issue of sentencing. A judgment of "not
guilty by reason of mental incapacity" and a
sentence imposing measures should be appealable
as are judgments of conviction and sentences
imposing punishment.
B. DETERMINATION or FITNEss To PROCEED;
MEASURES IMPOSED UPON THE
UNFIT; REMEDIES
(1) Selecting the Proper Test
The test of "fitness to proceed" is generally
thought to be different from that of "mental
capacity relative to the commission of crime."
The Model Penal Code follows the dominant
view in providing that "no person who as a result
of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted
or sentenced for the commission of an offense so
long as such incapacity endures."' 9 In the com-
ment the draftsmen criticize the practice in
some jurisdictions of declaring persons unfit to
proceed on a mere showing that they are psy-
chotic, with the result that such persons are com-
mitted; they cite with approval the practice
followed in England, where "the inquiry appears
to be genuinely focussed on the defendant's
capacity to understand and to defend."n The de-
sire to keep the test within narrow limits is mo-
tivated by consideration of the disadvantages
attaching to a finding of unfitness. Such disad-
vantages, in the opinion of the Model Code
draftsmen, are (1) that the defendant "is com-
mitted for custody and treatment under the shadow
of a trial if he recovers, possibly on a capital
charge," which is "hardly an aid to therapy";
(2) that many such persons have a sense of griev-
ance that they had no trial; and (3) that there
always remains the possibility of such person
being innocent and deprived of the opportunity to
clear himself.3
In our law the trial of a person unfit to proceed
is absolutely void, even when he is represented by
counsel." If constitutional provisions are to be
23 §4.04 (Tent. Draft No. 4,1955).
3Id., comment at 195.
31 Ibid.
2Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 391 (D.C. Cir.),
appeal pending, 366 U. S. 958 (1961); Ashley v. Pescor,
147 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945). See also Silving, Testing
of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L.
Rxv. 683, 697 (1956).
Of course, a person cannot be deemed "present" at
meaningful, they must be interpreted in the
light of their spirit rather than by their mere
letter. To be meaningful, the requixement of
fitness to proceed cannot be deemed satisfied
where the accused has but a superficial "under-
the trial if he is but bodily there; rather, he must be
aware of the "meaning" of the things said and done in
the course of procedure, and he must certainly be aware
and in control of his own communications and disposi-
tive actions. As will be later shown, he must be able to
"conduct his defense." At this point, however, I should
like to deal only with the accused's knowledge and
control of his own communications and actions. There
should be no need in our constitutional system to
stress that an accused in a criminal case must be aware
and in control of what he himself is "saying." "Saying"
means communicating an intended meaning, and not
some exceptional meaning not commonly attributed
to such types of communication. If he is in fact "com-
municating" something other than what he thinks he is
communicating or intends to communicate, it is as if
he were speaking a language he did not understand.
His "presence" is merely formal and there should be no
doubt that a trial under such conditions fails to meet
constitutional requirements.
Such is the situation, for example, when lie-detector
tests are allowed to be used in criminal proceedings.
The constitutional doubts regarding application of
such tests are magnified where the subject, though "fit
to proceed," belongs to a borderline class of those
deemed "fit." For this reason it seems proper to warn
again against use of such fascist methods of investi-
gation in our criminal proceedings.
Professor Skolnik, Scientifi Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YAr= L. J.
694, 724-25 (1961), has misunderstood the nature of
the legal, constitutional, and psychological "issue"
when criticizing my argument against admission of
lie-detector tests in criminal proceedings. He appar-
ently believes to have met my contention that the lie-
detector tests the "unconscious" by stating that "lie
detection does not bring out repressed materials in the
individual's life history," since "[wihat the polygraph
actually tests is 'conscious' conflict between the answer
given to the interrogator and the faqts as believed by
the accused," and since the physiological responses
recorded by the polygraph and thus serving as media
of apprising the investigator that the subject is lying
"arise out of emotions felt by the individual while
lying," which emotions are consciously felt. "It is
important to emphasize," says Mr. Skolnik, "that such
feelings are always consciously felt. Freud makes this
emphatically clear: 'It is surely of the essence of an
emotion that we should feel it, i.e., that it should enter
consciousness. So for emotions, feelings, and affects to
be unconscious would be quite out of the question.'
There is, thus, no interference by lie detection with
'freedom of the will' in the sense of unconscious prob-
ing. Of course, the subject's answers may be uncon-
sciously motivated, but this is true of any testimony.
In that sense, there is never any 'freedom of mind and
will.' " For the stated reasons, Mr. Skolnik also denies
the propriety of my joining the polygraph with so-
called 'truth serums' under the heading 'objective
tests.'
Before dealing with probing the "unconscious," in
the psychoanalytical sense, by means of a lie-detector
(of course, I hope that the "probing" itself is not
"unconscious," as is suggested by Mr. Skolnik's use of
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standing" of the proceedings or a verbal ability
"to assist in his own defense." The mere fact
that an accused talks rationally and is able to
"tell his attorney of the events as he recalls them"
has been held by the United States Supreme
language), it may be useful to inquire into the matter
of robing the contents of the accused's mind by use
of his own verbal utterances in such a manner as to
make them potentially convey a social meaning differ-
ent from their normal meaning. Verbally the accused
communicates "I did not do it," but his autonomic
responses "communicate" for him that he does not
believe his verbal statement to be true; thus he actually
"communicates" that he knows he did it. It is irrelevant
that this unusual meaning of the verbal utterance is
conveyed by use of a by-product of that utterance,
rather than by attributing to the utterance an excep-
tional "code" meaning. The fact remains that such
unusual meaning is not intended to be conveyed by the
speaker, and that he may be unaware that he is con-
veying it. This method of probing is not comparable to
compelling a person to speak so that he might be
identified by the sound of his voice, for the lie-detector
method actually probes the contents of the human
mind. It compels him to reveal what he thinks, to admit
when he does not wish to admit. It is an "objective"
method of inquiry, in that the subject is "used as a
medium of proof" (Beweismittel) against his will and
thus in violation of his right to "conduct" his defense.
Even more significant is the fact that the autonomic
response which serves as a medium of "communication"
of the contents of the accused's mind is elicited by the
emotion or feeling of "anxiety." Freud said in the very
paper cited by Professor Skolnik, On the Unconscious,
in 4 CoL.EcEn PAPERS 89, 112 (The International
Psycho-Analytical Library 1948): "It is possible for
affective development to proceed directly from the
system Ucs [Unconscious]; in this case it always has
the character of anxiety, the substitute for all 'repressed'
affects." Even in the cited paper Freud's theory of the
affects was by no means as simple as Professor Skolnik
seems to assume on the basis of two sentences taken out
of context. Moreover, this paper was first published in
1915. Since that time the psychoanalytic theory of the
affects has undergone many changes; today it consti-
tutes one of the most controversial topics of psycho-
analysis. See E. Jacobson, The Affects and their Pleasure-
Unpleasure Qualities in Relation to the Psychic Dis-
charge Processes, in Dazvxs, Anrzcrs, AND BEHAVlOR
38 (Loewenstein ed. 1953).
For legal purposes it is most significant that the lie-
detector response is produced by fear, for this is a
typical means of inquisitorial questioning. In psycho-
analytic theory "anxiety" occupies a distinctive
place, in the sense indicated in the above quoted
Freudian sentence. Professor Skolnik says that it is
irrelevant how a response is "motivated," since any
testimony may be "unconsciously motivated." He
forgets that there is a decisive difference between
eliciting an answer that may incidentally be "uncon-
sciously motivated"-although even incidental moti-
vation by fear may cast doubt on the propriety of using
such answer as evidence - and utilizing such motiva-
tion, particularly the motivation of fear, as a specific
means of eliciting an answer, apart from the fact that
the answer itself in lie-detection is not an "answer" in
the sense of purposeful communication.
As seen, lie-detection is an "objective" method of
testing. It is thus properly joined with "truth sera"
under the heading "objective tests." The fact that
Court insufficient to qualify him as capable to
stand trial. Clearly, he must be able to interpret
the events meaningfully and not merely to relate
them, particularly where a significant element of
the offense charged is his mental relation to the
events. But there is no precise notion in our law
of the function which the accused must be men-
tally equipped to perform in order to qualify as
"fit to proceed." The term generally used to de-
scribe this function is "assistance," the accused
being expected to "assist" his attorney in the
defense. Yet, this term does not properly reflect
the otherwise prevailing notion of the attorney-
client relationship, according to which the ac-
cused is the dominus litis and his attorney is but
an agent. Crucial decisions are thus made by the
accused and not by his attorney. Nor can an
attorney commit the accused in any significant
matters 'against his will; indeed, in some juris-
dictions it is insufficient if the attorney makes
such a commitment in the presence of the accused
when the latter preserves silence.U Accordingly,
"fitness to proceed" should be cast in terms of the
defendant's "capacity to conduct the criminal
proceedings against him in a meaningful manner"
rather than in terms of "capacity to assist in the
there are also distinctions between these tests, of
course, is not a bar against their being grouped together
for purposes to which their similarity is relevant. In one
respect the lie-detector test may be said to be more
objectionable than the "truth serum" test: it utilizes
anxiety as a medium of investigation. Mueller expressed
this metaphorically by saying that "the polygraph
chair... does not look unlike the electric chair!"
See Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation
Privileges and Limitations, 52 J. CRnL L., C. & P. S.
1, 11 (1961). Quite clearly, when subjected to any of
the "objective tests," the person concerned is "not
fit to proceed."
It may be pertinent to note that the accused's unfit-
ness to proceed renders his trial invalid also in civil
law countries. See, for instance, the German Straf-
prozessordung (Code of Criminal Procedure), §§205,
338 (5); on this see SciwARz, STARAomZssoRnNuqG,
comment to §205 (22d rev. ed. 1961).
3 In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960),
the Supreme Court stated the test of a defendant's
capacity to stand trial to be "whether he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding--and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him."
4 Thus, in Puerto Rico, for example, by virtue of
express provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
art. 164; 34 L.P.R.A. §403, a confession to be valid
must be made by the accused "personally." An allega-
tion of culpability made in the presence of the accused
by his attorney is null and void, and a sentence based
on such allegation is subject to review by habeas corpus.
Jimnez v. Jones, 74 D.P.R. 260, 263-64 (1953).
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defense." This calls for a high degree of perform-
ance capacity.
One may well doubt the realism, in the light
of present scientific insight, or the rationality,
in the light of present conceptions of philosophy,
of the disparate treatment of "mental capacity
to commit crime" and "fitness to proceed." We
have learned that the human mind does not
lend itself to fragmentation into topographically
distinctive compartments. But we continue to
divide that mind historically, that is, to con-
ceive of mental phenomena as distinctive and
separable episodes, treating them as independent,
fixed, and immutable entities. Not only is this
treatment based on a lack of insight into the
continuity of mental life-a continuity present
even where it may appear disrupted-, but also it
proceeds from a questionable philosophical
assumption of a distinctive fixed past mental
reality that "existed" apart from its present
symptoms or its present reflection in the mind of a
person. It is unnecessary to delve into intricate
problems of the philosophical struggle between
realism and idealism or of the possibility of giving
either of these positions a meaningful linguistic
expression; for surely in law a past event is mean-
ingful only when it is or can be proved. Leaving
aside perjury, distortion, and bars imposed by the
limitations of linguistic expression, for legal pur-
poses a past event is but its present mental
reflection-either a direct reflection, a recollec-
tion, or an indirect one; built upon some other
symptom. The same is true of past psychological
states. They exist to the extent that they are
remembered. Since a person's mental experience
is never truly conveyable to another, the subject
who has a mental experience, for example, "in-
tends" to commit a crime, would seem to be the
approximately best qualified witness to that ex-
perience. While this may appear doubtful in the
light of psychoanalytic insight, in law the testi-
.mony of the accused as to his "intent" to commit
the crime charged-if he chooses to testify-is a
significant, if not the most significant, item of
evidence. Since such "intent" exists today only
as a recollection, it is hardly possible to separate
the intent from the recollection. That "intent,"
phenomenologically, is a recollection. Obviously,
permitting, e.g., a psychotic person to testify
to his past "intent" cuts deeply into the very sub-
stance of such intent.
Since a trial culminates in a disposition-and
in a rational legal system is emphatically not a
ritual but a social institution which derives mean-
ing from the fact that it thus results in a socially
adequate disposition-, every procedural aspect
of trial should be viewed in the light of the dis-
positive portion of law. One might query whether
a sanction for a past conduct can be meaning-
fully applied to a defendant regardless of his
present mental state relative to that conduct and
its accompanying mental state. It seems unjust
to punish a man who has no present insight into
the conduct for which he is being punished or into
the full meaning of such conduct. There is at
stake the total doctrine of "guilt" as present
imputability of a past event. 35
Perhaps the law of the future will succeed in
integrating the test of mental incapacity and that
of unfitness to proceed. But such integration is
predicated upon a complete re-evaluation of our
basic legal conceptions of the mental element, a
total review of the notions of "intent," "reckless-
ness," even "motive," as historically fixed phe-
nomena. Until such re-evaluation is made, we
must tentatively accept a distinctive notion of
"fitness to proceed." Yet, even today we must
not forget that such fitness is an integral part
of essential elements of crime. In a sense, it is
35For an interesting treatment of the problem of
amnesia and its bearing on fitness to proceed see Note,
Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of Particular
Justice, supra note 19. The problem of any man's
capacity to defend himself in a criminal trial is always
open to some doubt, for hardly any individual can
preserve a proper balance of mind in the face of his own
criminal trial. Should a mere neurotic wish for convic-
tion constitute finfitness? As remarked by Judge
Holtzoff in United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23,
41 (D.D.C. 1961), "The fact is that all criminals
commit mistakes and it is generally their own errors
that lead to their apprehension and conviction. A
perfect crime is unknown." A long time ago, Mitter-
maier and Hans Gross puzzled about "the very extra-
ordinary psychological problem" of confessions which
are of no conceivable benefit to the person concerned.
See GRoss, CRnmeAL PSyCHOLoGY 31-33 (Kallen
transl., Modem Criminal Science Series 1918). Psycho-
analytical writers explained this "extraordinary
problem" when they discovered that an offender often
unconsciously desires to be punished. Freud, Der
Verbrecher aus Schuldbewusstsein, in X GESAmILTE
ScHism-i, Intemationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag
312. The traces of crime left by the offender that lead
to his capture are hardly attributable to accident.
Should an accused be held "unfit to proceed" merely
because he left such traces?
It would seem that, as in the case of mental incapa-
city relative to the act charged, so in the case of fitness
to proceed, the test should be interpreted on a com-
parative basis, that is, taking into consideration the




itself an element of crime. Legality requires adop-
tion of a broad notion of "unfitness to proceed."
However, methods are available to reduce and
to modify the disadvantages incident to a finding
of unfitness. One such method may help to put an
end to the criminal proceedings in appropriate
cases; another one pertains to the consequences
attaching to a finding of unfitness.
(2) Objective Trial
The gravest injustice is inflicted upon a person
by criminal law commitment upon a finding of
unfitness to proceed, when it later turns out that
he had not committed any criminal act. More-
over, the psychiatric opinion regarding a de-
fendant's capacity to stand trial may often turn on
the question whether he in fact committed the
act with which he is charged. 36 On this question
may also depend desirability of commitment even
of the civil type, when the person concerned is
otherwise found to be mentally ill,3' for mental
disease is not per se an indication of danger
whereas commission of serious criminal violence
may be such an indication.
The Royal Medico-Psychological Association
of Great Britain and Ireland (1924) suggested
the following solution of this important problem:3
"When a person is found unfit to plead, we
would suggest that a plea of not guilty should
be recorded by the Court, and the trial on the
facts allowed to proceed in his absence if he
cannot properly be present in Court, arrange-
ments being made for him to be represented by
counsel and solicitor."
Such procedure, of course, would be unconstitu-
tional in the United States.39 But a modified form
of the same idea may not be unconstitutional.
Where a defendant is found unfit to proceed and
it is further found that such unfitness is not likely
to be of short duration, a "tentative trial" might
be held, in which a Public Defender of the Rights
of the Mentally Ill would appear in the defendant's
behalf. On the basis of such trial, the defendant
36 MacNiven, Psychoses and Criminal Responsibility,
in MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND CR mE 8, 63 (Radzino-
wicz & Turner ed., II English Studies in Criminal
Science 1949).
3 Eaton, Functions of the Psychiatrist in the Court
and Prison, in CRIME AND INSANITY 165, 170-71 (Nice
ed. 1958).
38 Quoted by MacNiven, supra note 36, at 63. See
also MAss. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TmRTY-SrxT REPORT
22-24, 27-28 (1960), quoted in MODEL PENAL CODE
§4.06, comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
9 Compare note 32, supra.
might be found not to have committed the act
charged or otherwise acquitted, provided however
that he could not be thus acquitted on the ground
of insanity, for he must not on the basis of such
trial be subjected to any type of state interven-
tion. Nor could he be found in such trial to have
committed the criminal act or prejudiced in any
other manner. A denial of a declaration that the
defendant did not commit the act charged or a
refusal to acquit in a tentative trial should not
be admissible in evidence in any later trial of the
defendant.
(3) Measures Imposed Upon Persons Unfit
To Proceed
When the court finds that a person lacks fitness
to proceed, the Model Penal Code provides that
"the Court shall commit him to the custody of
the Commissioner of Correction to be placed in
an appropriate institution of the Department of
Correction for so long as such unfitness shall
endure." 40 This disposition seems harsh, especially
since at this stage the defendant is presumed
innocent; in functional terms this presumption
means that he ought not be subject to any nor-
mal consequences of guilt. Nor is such commit-
ment necessary in all cases for preventive or pro-
tective purposes. Though mentally ill, the de-
fendant may be neither dangerous nor in need of
treatment; he may be treatable as an outpatient;
or the crime charged may be minor, indicating no
particular danger to society even if it should be
repeated. Where the crime charged is not minor,
the danger of its repetition and the social loss
such repetition would entail ought to be weighed
against the restriction of a man's liberty when he
has not been convicted of any crime and may well
be innocent. The "objective trial" that has been
recommended would afford some safeguard against
abuse of detention in instances of this type.
However, where such trial fails to result in a find-
ing that the defendant did not commit the act
charged, refusal of such finding must not be deemed
even a prima facie showing of crime commission.
The principle of favor libertatis requires limitation
of automatic assignment to a mental institution
to situations of grave social danger. The danger,
at this stage, must be measured by the graveness
of the act charged. Assignment to an appropriate
institution should be ordered in all cases where the
act charged falls within the category of crimes
4 MODEL PENAL CODE §4.06 (2), supra, note 4.
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against life, bodily integrity, or health, that is,
crimes against the person. In cases other than
these, such assignmen should be predicated upon a
showing by the prosecution of danger of irre-
mediable serious harm to the community.41
Of course, in instances where the trial is sus-
pended due to the defendant's unfitness to pro-
ceed there obtains a social interest in the ad-
vancement of the trial. For this reason, the court
ought to have power to order that the defendant
be treated, if such treatment is psychiatrically in-
dicated, even where he is not confined in a mental
institution, and provided that he consents to such
treatment. The court should also have power to
order appropriate protective measures, such as
to place the defendant under supervision of a social
work agency, and to prohibit him from fre-
quenting taverns or driving a- car, as the circum-
stances may suggest. The court should order a
periodic examination of the defendant, whether
or not detained in a mental hospital, with a view
to ascertaining whether he has recovered fitness
to proceed.
For the purpose of appeal, any court order
declaring a defendant infit to proceed or assigning
him to a mental hospital or imposing upon him
any other measure should be deemed a convic-
tion.42
When the defendant recovers fitness to proceed
after a long time has elapsed silice suspension of
proceedings, the court should have power to dis-
miss the charge unless prosecution and trial ap-
* pear to be dearly in the public interest. The court
should weigh the length of time that has elapsed
4 In the District. of Columbia, United States v.
Pound, Crim. No. 76028, D.D.C., Nov. 26, 1945,
raised the issue whether a defendant unfit to stand
trial can be detained indeflifitely, when the probability
of his recovery is very minute. Bufit the issue within due
process would seem to be whether such person may be
detained at all unless he is shown to be dangerous.
Krash, supra note 28, at 917, suggested that due
process may be said to require that a defendant be
* released even though he may be dangerous if it appears
that he will never recover sufficiently to stand trial. It
would seem, however, that orderly procedure in such
cases requires dismissal of the charge, rather than a
discharge notwithstanding dangerousness, when the
person concerned was detained in the first place on no
rational basis other than the prospect of a future trial.
It is submitted that a rational rather than doctrinaire
approach requires that the court be given power in all
cases of manifest and serious danger to order a tempo-
rary emergency measure of continued detention until
civil commitment proceedings are instituted and
terminated.
41 Compare §6(c) of the Israeli law cited supra, note
13.
against the seriousness of the charge in considering
the advisability of dismissal.
II. THE SCHEME OF MEASURES AP-
PLICABLE IN CASES OF ACQUITTAL
BY REASON OF MENTAL
INCAPACITY
As stated in the introduction, punishment ought
to be confined to the distinctive purpose pursued
by its means. It should never be imposed on the
assumption that it might serve any one of a num-
ber of mutually interchangeable purposes, such as
retribution, deterrence, reformation, or com-
munity protection. The prevailing uncertainty
and flexibility of the so-called ends of punishment
violate the dignity of man, who-if necessity
dictates that he be used as a means to an end
other than himself-should never be used as a
means to some indefinite end. It is unjust to
punish a man or to increase his punishment with-
out some basis in his guilt, on the ground that
he is dangerous. The proper reaction to "danger"
is a "security measure," which bears no social
stigma.
A planned, systematic diversification of punish-
ment and measures is not merely a jurisprudential
nicety, a requirement of legal aesthetics or of
elegantiae juris, but is a significant safeguard
against encroachment upon civil liberties. Lack of
systematization in measures has resulted in this
country, on the one hand, in a relative failure to
appreciate that in measures, just as in punish-
ment, a "legality" issue is posed, and on the other
hand, in a haphazard assertion of civil liberties.
Thus, according to the Model Penal Code, a
person accused of committing a minor crime-for
example, of stealing property of small value-,
when found unfit to proceed would be assigned to
the Department of Correction without possibility
of trial or release until he recovered, although he
may not have committed the act at all and, even
if he had, may not require such detention on the
basis of the nature of the disease from which he
suffers. In contrast, the methods obtaining, for
instance, in the District of Columbia for uncondi-
tional or conditional release from a mental hos-
pital4l to which a person "acquitted solely on the
ground that he was insane at the time of ... com-
mission" is assigned, have become notorious."
3D.C. Code Ann. §24-301 (Supp. 8 1960).
" See Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach
to Crime and Correction, 23 LAw & CoriMv . PROB.
650, 661-62 -(1958); Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness
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When the problem of such release is in issue, we
find psychiatrists pleading for "civil liberties" of
the person thus detained after an extremely brief
period although that person had admittedly
killed another human being and although no
contention is made that the detainee has re-
covered from his disease.45 This contrasts strangely
with the lack of any evidence of humanitarian con-
cern for the "civil liberties" of the petty thief
confined for an indeterminate period as unfit to
proceed, although there is certainly no sufficient
warrant in psychiatric authority for assuming that
such thief is particularly likely to turn into a
killer.
46
As in the punitive scheme, so in the scheme of
"measures," the "legality principle" must deter-
mine the direction and scope of the pursuit of
protection in a democratic society. This principle
affords the standards of the systematization of
protective measures. Space limitations bar discus-
sion of general rules of "legality" as applied to
"measures," but for the specific purpose of recom-
mending "measures" to be applied in "mental
incapacity" cases, it is necessary to point out
certain guides based upon the "legality prin-
ciple."
(1) As there must be no punishment except
where there is guilt (ndula poena sine culpa), so
there must be "no measure except for protection
and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision To
Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70
YALE L. J. 225 (1960); Krash, supra, note 28 at 944-46.
45 Miss Hough, whose case aroused much attention,
killed a visitor who came to express his sympathy to
her over the recent death of her father (a psychiatrist),
because, as she later said, the victim became "psycho-
logically aggressive." She committed this homicide in
May 1957, but had been known to suffer from paranoid
schizophrenia of the aggressive type at least as early as
1945. See Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C.
Cir. 1959); see particularly Judge Miller's dissenting
opinion, id., 463, 468.
46 NORVEL MoRRs in his brilliant monograph on
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL (1951) found "specificity of
recidivism" to prevail in the "preventive detainees"
whose cases he examined, id. 317-22, whereas in "con-
firmed recidivists" the same writer found 38% showing
variation in crime types, id. 360-66. In ALEXANDER
& HEALY'S RooTS oF CRXx (1935), the subjects of
study showed no deviation from one crime pattern.
The WOLTENDEN REPORT (REPORT OF THE COm-
MITTEE ON HOMOsEXUAL OrrxNSES AND PRoSTITU-
TiON, Cmnd. 247, H.M. Stationary Office 1957) stated,
para. 57 at 23: "We are authoritatively informed that
a man who has homosexual relations with an adult
partner seldom turns to boys, and vice-versa, though it
is apparent from the police reports we have seen and
from other evidence submitted to us that such cases
do happen." See also MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE CRIMINAL 143 (1958).
against danger." Furthermore, as punishment
ought to be "guilt-adequate," so measures ought
to be "danger-adequate," meaning that they
must not exceed in scope and duration the danger
which they are purported to avert. For this
reason, except where a minimum period is pre-
scribed by reason of a presumptive minimum
duration of danger, a measure may be terminated
at any time by the court either ex officio or on
motion of the prosecution, the head of the institu-
tion in which the person concerned is detained, or
that person himself. Where a measure is imposed
for a time exceeding a certain minimum duration,
mandatory review of continued dangerousness at
stated intervals is of the essence of legality.
(2) The conflict between the social interest in
communiiy protection against danger emanating
from a human being and the individual interest
in freedom ought to be resolved in conformity
to the "legality principle." As in all areas of civil
liberties, the aim must be to establish a proper
balance between the social and the individual
interest.
In this context it is important to note that a
certain coordination is necessary between the
punitive and the protective scheme. Since, to
meet the presumption favoring freedom in the
punitive field, the recommended definition of
mental incapacity exempting from punitive re-
sponsibility has been formulated in broad terms,
the notion of "dangerousness" against which pro-
tection by measures may be afforded should not
be too narrow. For example, the recommended
definition has been extended to include conditions
which in many countries come within the notions
of "partial" and "diminished responsibility."' 7
Persons of such reduced responsibility, while
enjoying full exemption within the recommended
definition, may be as dangerous as those who
suffer from grave mental illness. They ought to
be treated by measures. However, there should
be no undue discrepancy between maxima of
intervention by way of measures and punitive
maxima.
(3) A significant "legality" safeguard is elimina-
tion of arbitrariness and inequality of treatment.
Hence, the aim must be in measures, as in punish-
ment, to afford whenever possible objective
standards and tests.
(4) It is important to stress that the "criminal
41 Compare Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal
Law, supra note 1, at 74-78.
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conduct" engaged in by the defendant, in addition
to being a significant indicium of the actor's
"dangerousness," performs a crucial "political"
function in the law of measures as well as in the
punitive scheme.
• No criminal law state intervention should be
permissible unless the person concerned has "done
soniething" cognizable at criminal law. When it is
necessary for the protection of the public or of the
individual himself to detain an individual or to
restrain his freedom in any other way though he
has not committed any "criminal act," civil com-
mitment or other civil or administrative measures
are the proper forms of intervention. One might
argue that insistence on a distinction between a
civil and a criminal law commitment is a super-
fluous formalism, since in either type of commit-
ment the person concerned is deemed "not guilty."
"Not guilty," according to this interpretation, is a
metaphysical quality, whereas in the phenom-
enological view of "guilt" adopted by the writer
"ndt guilty" merely means that certain legal-
political and social demands do not apply to the
particular individual or case, with the result that
he is not held punitively responsible. 48 Such in-
dividual may nevertheless be "responsible" in
measures, provided that the proper demands of
the protective province of criminal law are ap-
plicable in his case. One could express this by
saying that there obtains within the protective
scheme a distinctive concept of "guilt" possessing
no moralistic connotations and not predicated
upon the presence of technical mens rea, but
presupposing the existence of "criminal conduct"
as described by law.49 Nor is absence of mens rea
tantamount to a realistic lack of a mental element,
be it intent or recklessness or consciousness of il-
48 On the "penal," though not "punitive," nature
of measures see Silving, "Rule of Law" in Criminal
Justice, supra note 6, at 145. On the meaning of "guilt"
see Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal.Law, supra
note 1, at 23-24.
49 Such concept of " gilt" referring solely to engage-
ment in criminal conduct or to production of a crim-
inal harm prevails in large segments of the population.
The question most commonly raised when the issue of
"guilt" is posed is "Has he done it?"
I am using the term "criminal conduct" in the sense
of a conduct engaged in under such circumstances and
entailing such results as to amount to a crime as
described by law, but for the absence of the required in-
tent -or recklessness, knowledge of illegality, or mental
capadty. The GEanN DRAFT OF A PENA., CODE, 1960
(E -onu x-xs SzAzGESETZBUCHEs (STGB) E 1960(Bundesrat Drucksache 270/60, 1960), §11 .(1) 2,
adopts a similar concept called "illegal act" (recltsrwid-
rige Tat).
legality,6° although these mental factors are not
punitively ascribable or imputable to the mentally
incapacitated defendant. Still, one might query
why it is necessary to differentiate between such
non-moralistic protective "guilt" at criminal law
and the corresponding factor that gives rise to
administrative or civil measures, and why should
"criminal conduct" be made a condition of criminal
law intervention?
The answer to the first question is that differ-
entiation between criminal law and administrative
intervention is necessary because the proper aims
of criminal law are distinctive from those of ad-
ministrative law, so that distinctive types of
linitations are applicable in the two fields. The
protective function of criminal law is limited in a
democratic society to the necessary minimum
called for in criminal law context. Thus, for ex-
ample, care for the mentally ill, which constitutes
an important reason for a civil law commitment, is
not a proper ground for criminal law commitment,
though once committed at criminal law the person
concerned ought to receive the necessary care.
Nor is treatment and cure a direct goal of criminal
law commitment. Treatment is a proper criminal
law "measure" solely as a means of eliminating
or reducing dangerousness,51 aimed at advancing
release of the defendant and at protection of the
community.1 The direct function of criminal law
measures is the protection of others against the
dangerousness of an individual who has done
something cognizable at criminal law, as a law
concerned with socially harmful acts.
The second question, as to why criminal conduct
must be a condition of criminal law intervention,
raises the highly controversial issue of "pre-
delictual measures," that is, according to prevail-
ing definition, measures applied preventively, in
anticipation of criminal conduct. There has been
a great deal of confusion regarding these measures,
attributable to a large degree to a lack of proper
analysis in the light of principles of political
philosophy applicable to criminal law.
Adherents of predelictual measures claim that
50 On the latter as part of mens rea, see Ryu &
Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI.
L. REv. 421, 430, 440-42 (1957).
61 In the law of punishment it may be an imprison-
ment substitute or a means of abbreviating detention.
On this see Silving, "Rule of Law" in Criminal Justice,
supra note 6, at 139-40.
Once the individual has been committed, treatment
may be called for as part of the care for the individual,
which the state should afford to anyone in its custody.
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no objections can be raised against them on
legality grounds so long, as these measures are
administered strictly in accordance with statutes
that describe each measure and the situations to
which it may be applied, and so long as these
measures are imposed by courts of ordinary crimi-
nal jurisdiction. Thus, the requirement that
criminal law intervention be limited to situations
in which the subject has done some definite anti-
social "act," in the opinion of these scholars, is a
dispensable formality. But this argument is based
on misunderstanding of a most significant sub-
stantive aspect of legality which bars any type
of criminal law state intervention unless there is
present an actual, definite, dear, and identifiable
harm to persons other than the person concerned.
A man's existential situation, his objectionable
general life conduct, his manner of being (modv
de ser), his "being thus" (So-Sein), is not a proper
basis for either punishment or measures. The so-
called "criminal law of the actor," which purports
to attach criminal sanctions to the type of per-
sonality which a man possesses rather than to a
specific harmful act committed by him, has been
discredited in the post-war era, particularly as a
consequence of its having been carried ad absurdum
by the National Socialist regime.5M
True, in the province of measures there is a
marked tendency to stress qualities of the person
concerned, his personality, and general life conduct.
Indeed, the decisive factor in the law of measures
is dangerousness, which is to a large degree a
personality feature. Hence, this law is a "law of
the actor," and its foremost function is precisely
to relieve punitive law of its protective aspects
and thus facilitate its functioning as a "law of
guilt," in the sense of responsibility for a definite
crime. But, as shown by the German experience
with National Socialist criminal law philosophy,
which focussed on "what a man is" in disregard
of "what he does," there is a greater social danger
in adopting a criminal law, even of measures,
which is wholly oriented to personalities and re-
quires no specific act to warrant state intervention,
than there is in leaving potentially dangerous
personalities at large. Emphatically, a "criminal
act" is and must remain an essential requirement
of legality in measures, as well as in punishment.
A caveat is necessary as regards the scope of
the "act:requirement." It is possible to manipulate
13 On the history of the "law of the actor" see Silving,
"Rule of Law" in Criminal Justice, supra note 6 at
98-104.
this requirement by creating special types of
"criminal conduct" which have the misleading
appearance of valid statutory crime types, dis-
tinguishable from other crime types solely by
being sanctioned by measures and not by punish-
ment. Whether a provision creating a criminal
conduct thus sanctioned is justifiable in a demo-
cratic society depends, as does the legality of any
criminal law provision, on whether the conduct
thus proscribed is sufficiently harmful to society,
in the sense of violating essential legal interests of
persons other than the offender, to warrant im-
posing upon such conduct highly limitative crim-
inal law sanctions."
5There are two opposing principal views on what
is and what is not a proper subject of regulation and
sanctioning by the criminal law. According to one
of these, the criminal law may or indeed ought to
enforce either Divine or popular notions of morality.
For a recent exposition of the latter version see DxvLNm
(Lord Justice Devlin), THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORAlS
(Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence of the British
Academy 1959). According to the second view, the
function of criminal law is confined to prohibiting
and sanctioning conduct which is harmful to others,
"harm" being understood to mean an injury other
than a mere offensiveness to moral sensitivities. This
view has been recently expressed in the WOLFENDEN
REPORT, supra note 46, at 9-10. Some believe that the
choice between these two positions is a matter of moral
preference. It is submitted that such is not the case.
The position adopted by the WOLENDEN REPORT is a
dictate of legality. A man's freedom from criminal law
state intervention into his life is a civil liberty, immune
against majority rule unless a clear and serious harm
to the community or any member thereof exists or is
obviously threatened. The mere fact that a popular
majority or a representative group of the community,
such as a jury or the famed "Clapham Bus" com-
muters, desires intervention into the life of a person
because it is displeased with the general manner in
which he conducts his life or with what he may be
doing is not a sufficient ground in a democracy for
prescribing or permitting state intervention, any more
than such intervention into the affairs of a man's
conscience, religion, or opinion is justifiable simply
because the majority finds them non-conformist or
obnoxious. This philosophy of government precludes
enactment of any such legislation as the vagrants
laws, common in both common and civil law countries.
It may be noted parenthetically that there is no objec-
tion against creation of special "criminal conduct"
types sanctioned solely by measures, such as is the
Italian "agreement to commit a crime," ITALIAN
PENAL CODE art. 115 (2) & arts. 215, 228. It may be
argued that in cases of this nature there is "criminal
law" state intervention without a "crime." But as in
the case of measures applied to persons acquitted solely
by reason of mental incapacity, there is present, while
not a "crime," a "criminal conduct," as described by
statute and sanctioned by measures in conformity to
a statute. So long as such criminal conduct fulfills the
requirement of creating a harm cognizable in criminal
law, no objections can be raised. This requirement is
not fulfilled in the Italian "putative crime," also sanc-
tioned by measures. Id. art. 49 (1) & (4).
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Having shown that the "criminal conduct" en-
gaged in by a person found to have possessed no
mental capacity is an important safeguard of the
legality of any measures imposed upon him, we
shall henceforth deal with such conduct solely
as a potential indicium or symptom of such
person's dangerousness. Our tasks.in the following
ar" to find the proper standards by which "danger-
ousness" and its degree might be judged; there-
after we must seek measures differing in stringency
and scope depending on the degree of "danger" to
be averted; and lastly, we must settle the proper
procedure for the ascertainment of "dangerous-
ness" and of its degree. The first mentioned tasks
will be discussed in Section 1, and a separate
section will be devoted to treatment of constitu-
tional and procedural aspects.
A. SuBsTrvErw PRovisioNs
This section deals in separate sub-divisions with
(1) the test of "dangerousness"; (2) "danger-
adequate" measures; and (3) special categories of
the mentally incapacitated, "habitual offenders"
and "offenders not susceptible to punishment."
(1) Test of "Dangerousness"
The question of the proper test of "dangerous-
ness" is controversial. In doctrinal disputes waged
in civil law countries views are divided between
the "objectivists," who attribute a more or less
decisive significance to the "act" committed by
the defendant, and the "subjectivists," who
believe the role of that act to be negligible. 55. As,
most doctrinal disputes among civil law scholars,
this one is conducted on a metaphysical level. The
contention is made that what is "dangerousness"
must be determined independently from the
protective need, since "dangerousness" is a condi-
tion and determinant of protection. 6 Within a
functional view of "dangerousness," however, its
definition is not merely the result of an objective
finding of "danger," but also depends on the-
protective policy assumed, requiring a policy
decision on how much danger society must tolerate.
That policy in turn depends upon the important
constitutional issues of the extent to which the
defendant's civil liberties may be permitted to
yield to the protective interest of the community
55 On the variety of views on this subject see OIESA
MuiRno, LAS MEDMAS DE SEGUgiDAD 55-81, (Publi-
caciones del Seminario de Derecho Penal y Crimino-
logia de ]a Universidad de Barcelona 1951).
56Id. at 73.
or of certain of its members,7 and of the proper
methods of ascertaining dangerousness. ,Similarly
barren seem to be the debates waged in civil law
countries on whether "dangerousness" is a "quality
of the actor" or a "quality of the act." 'Danger-
ousness" is simply a factor or a combination of
factors raising a justifiable protective need, mean-
ing that protection of that need is authorized in a
democratic society. There need not be a single
indicium of "dangerousness." "Danger" may
evince from a combination of indicia, some
personal, others situational, and among the former,
the "act" committed by the defendant may play
a more or less decisive role, as compared with
other factors. But "legality" requires that so far
as possible the indicia of "dangerousness" and
their relative weight under varying circumstances
be formulated.2
Admission of prediction tables in aid of deter-
mining dangerousness does not dispense with the
necessity of formulating statutory indicia of
dangerousness. For no contention is made that
such tables afford a full proof of the presence or
absence of dangerousness in any given case. It is
submitted that the appropriateness of using such
tables should be first considered in each case by
the Psychiatric and Sociological Examination
Center, which may or may not recommend their
use by the court in weighing the variety of factors
that enter into a determination of the issue of
dangerousness. As any recommendation of the
center, this one ought to be considered, but need
not be followed, by the court.
(a) The Criminal "Act" as Indicium of "Danger-
ousnless"
As seen, the criminal "act" or that which we
have chosen to call "criminal conduct" performs
a dual function in the law of measures; it is a con-
dition of legality and an indicium of "dangerous-
ness." An incident of its latter function is a third
role, to which attention has been drawn by civil
law scholars. They have distinguished between
"objective danger" and "subjective danger or
67 The problem has been raised in civil law countries
whether the danger against which criminal law pro-
tection may be afforded must be one to the community
at large or whether it is sufficient if only certain indi-
viduals are endangered. This distinction is believed
to be utterly barren.58 Article 133 of the Italian Penal Code, though in
terms a sentencing guide for punitive purposes, is
considered to be a catalogue of indicia of dangerous-
ness, which is an important factor in punishment as
well as in measures.
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fear."5 9 We may discard a limine as irrelevant at
criminal law those fears that are wholly illusory.
But a fear, perhaps a panic, aroused in the com-
munity by a serious crime, for example a homicide,
though committed without punitively attributable
mens rea, is a valid consideration in determining
whether protection should be afforded, though
this consideration may not be alone decisive.
The extent to which the nature and gravity of
the act are symptomatic of the dangerousness of
the actor is a most controversial subject. Does
commission of a criminal act permit prediction of
future criminality on the part of the actor? If so,
is repetition of crime of the same nature and
gravity to be expected, or is future variation from
a previous pattern equally probable? In particular,
is a petty or small offender likely to turn to serious
crime? Is an offender against property likely to
endanger the life and health of his fellow men?
Psychiatrists stress that we must treat "crimi-
nals instead of crimes,"60 and that "criminals
cannot be classified on the basis of the type of
crime they commit." 61 This approach no doubt
finds support in the psychoanalytic finding that
crimes of apparently and legally widely differing
pattern may stem from similar profound motiva-
tions.6 But in the face of. the psychological "pan-
determinism" asserted by many psychiatrists,
such "actor-orientation" can hardly be taken to
imply that the type and gravity of the act com-
mitted by a defendant are not determined by his
profound psychological motivations. Dr. Mac-
Niven states that a person's "nature, his education,
and his ethical and social training" in many
instances modify his conduct even in mental
illness.6 In the light of psychoanalytic insight there
is mostly a sufficient likelihood of a causal connec-
59 On this see OI.SA MuRImo, op. cit. supra note 55,
at 57-59. Garofalo, who originated the doctrine of
"dangerousness," spoke of "temibilitd," the quality
of evoking fear. On this see id. at 64.60 KARL A. MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 455
(3d enlarged ed. 1955).6 1 ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL
ACT AND PUNISHMENT 128 (1954).
6Thus, for example, political crimes, in the light
of psychoanalytical interpretation, may represent
parricide. On this see the comprehensive treatment by
JIMf:NEZ DE AsfiA, PsIcoAN LIsis CRIMINAL 97-104
(5th enlarged ed. 1958), and literature cited there. If,
then, given different conditions, the stage is set for some
other crime against authority, for example, a teacher,
see MIRA Y L6p.z, MANUAL DE PSICOLOGiA JURfDICA
162-63, (4th ed. 1954) (describing the case of a boy
stealing pencils from his teacher), it is conceivable
that such crime will be committed.
"MacNiven, supra note 36, .at 52.
tion between unconscious motivations of the actor
and the type and gravity of the act committed by
him to justify assumption that such features of the
act have a bearing on his crime potential and thus
afford an indicium of what may be expected of him.
True, we are all potentially dangerous; Goethe
allegedly said that he could well imagine having
committed any conceivable crime." But when
a person has committed a crime, particularly a
serious one, surely the probability of his com-
mitting one in the future is greater than in the
case of a generally law-abiding citizen.
While unspecificity of recidivism has not been
proved, there is sufficient indication in experience
for fearing that in the case of reincidence the in-
dividual will repeat the same type of criminal
act as the one he has committed before6 5 Cer-
tainly, a person who in a state of mental incapacity
has killed another may be assumed more likely
to commit another homicide than a person who in
a similar mental state has committed merely
petty larceny. This assumption justifies diversifi-
cation in treatment of persons acquitted on the
ground of insanity depending on the nature and
gravity of the crime committed by them.66
In the process of determining the degree of a
person's dangerousness and the scope of danger-
adequate measures, the nature and gravity of the
actor's conduct and hence of the anticipated harm
ought to be the most significant items of considera-
tion. Also, the required degree of probability that
the harm will occur should be in inverse proportion
-to the seriousness of such harm." When combined
with the element of fear aroused within the com-
munity by an act of killing, the symptomatic
value of such an act as regards objective prob-
ability of repetition of the same pattern should
suffice to warrant certain minimum measures of
protection. No one who in a state of mental in-
capacity has killed another ought to be released
before the lapse of a minimum period of, for ex-
ample, two years, during which the subject should
be observed and treated. This time may also be
used to study the environmental conditions in
64 2 H. GRImM, GoET 245 (7th ed.), quoted in
WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFIECET 163 (6th ed.
1958).
65 Compare note 46, supra.
66 For diverse provisions as regards persons acquitted
by reason of insanity -depending on the nature of the
criminal act they committed and diverse terms of
confinement in a mental hospital depending on the
same factor see ITALIAN PENAL CODE art. 222.67 On this see HuRwTz, CRIbMNoLoOfA 427 (Spanish
transl. Haro-Garcia 1956).
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which he has lived as well as those to which he
must "return" upon release and to make adequate
plans for his future adjustment under conditions
most favorable to it.s It is not necessary that he
remain throughout the period of detention in a
mental hospital; in appropriate cases or at ap-
propriate stages he may be assigned, for example,
to a special colony or a training center.
True, a disposition for such minimum detention
period would raise a serious constitutional prob-
lem. But the alternative is delegation of authority
to psychiatrists or courts, acting under psychiatric
advice, to determine whether the individual con-
cerned continues to be dangerous. It is submitted
that a psychiatrist's evaluation of the issue of
continued dapgerousness, though entitled to con-
siderable weight, is not in the present state of
knowledge sufficiently supportable by readily
verifiable, objective data to justify risking the
danger to the community incident to an early
release, when the precipitating act was a homicide.
Also, the community's freedom from fear deserves
such minimum protection.
The community fear and the prognostic situa-
tion obtaining in cases where a homicide has been
committed in a state of mental incapacity are
applicable both to situations of chronic mental
disease and to those of temporary mental dis-
turbance, though there may be some difference in
degree. The killing of another human being in a
state of "mental black-out" can hardly be assumed
psychologically "accidental," meaning, not rooted
in the defendant's total personality. The com-
munity must be protected against recurrence of
fatal "black-outs." Even those acting in so-calle-
"states of automatism"-in whose case traditional
doctrine assumes the absence of an "act," requires
no plea of insanity for acquittal, and excludes ap-
plication of measures69-- can hardly be deemed to
produce death "accidentally." 70
6 Mental illness, though "cured," leaves mental
"scars. Also, the impression it leaves in the community
affects the subject's "acceptance" when he returns,
rendering his adjustment more difficult by exposing
him to unusual stress. Though there may be a thera-
peutic value in a return to normal life and the previous
environment, see Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d
458,462 (D.C. Cir. 1959), in some cases there might be
considerations favoring choice of a new environment,
less likely to contribute to the type of stress that
precipitated the criminal act.
69 "Automatism" is defined by HExDERSON & Gir-
LESPIE, A TExT-Boox or PsycmA RY 115 (8th ed.
1956), thus: "Automatic movements or autom.atism
occur in a pathological sense, without the subject's
being aware of their meaning, and even without his
Where the act committed by the accused is less
than homicide but would, except for his mental
incapacity, constitute a felony against the person,
an automatic minimum measure should also be
being aware of their happening at all." Various states
are referred to under this term, such as states resulting
from a discharging cerebral focus, see Mulder, Psychoses
with Brain Tumors and Other Chronic Neurologic Dis-
orders, in 2 AwameA HANDBOOK OF PSYCrATRY
1144, 1146-47 (Arieti ed. 1959), and various psycho-
gemc states of dissociation, such as somnambulism,
automatic writing, and fugue states, see Novxs &
KOLB, MODERN CLIcAL PsvcHIATRY 62--63 (5th ed.
1958). In law harm committed in such state is deemed
not to constitute "an act" or a "voluntary act," so
that the issue of intent or sanity does not arise at all.
Thus, for example, in R. v. Charlson, [1955], I W.L.R.
317, the prisoner, without any apparent motive, called
his ten year old son, telling him that there was a rat
to be seen standing on a stone in the river adjoining
the house. When the boy came, the prisoner picked
up a wooden mallet from the floor and struck the boy
twice on the head, causing blood to flow. He then
picked up the boy and threw him out of the window into
the river. The boy fell twenty-five feet into the river
and suffered severe injuries. The prisoner could give
no account of his motivation for acting as he did. He
raised no plea of insanity, but medical evidence was
given to the effect that his actions were consistent with
his having a cerebral tumor, a condition in which a
person is liable to an outburst of impulsive violence,
'quite motiveless," and over which he has no control.
He was acquitted even of the charge of inflicting griev-
ous bodily harm, for which no specific intent needs to
be proved. For further examples see Gr.ANvimL
WmLiA s, CRIMiNAL LAw, TAB GENmRAL PART 11
(1953); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §2.01, comment
at 121-22 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).70 Wiianms Automatism, in EssAys IN CRIMNAL
ScIEcNE 345 (Mueller ed. 1961), noticing that exclusion
of the mental incapacity issu; in such cases with con-
sequent inability to assign the defendant to a mental
hospital or otherwise to avert the danger which he
represents is a wrong disposition from the standpoint of
policy. The author says: "It seems that lawyers are
prisoners of their own conceptual scheme." Id. at 346.
The conceptual scheme itself is based on incorrect psy-
chiatric assumptions. Novms & KOLB, op. cit. slipra
note 69, at 62, explain dissociation thus: "... . in a
person in whom there is an active incompatibility
between repressed elements in his mental life and the
rest of his personality, the repressed components may
escape from the forces that are repressing them, become
separated from the usual consciousness, organize a
personality of their. own, as it were, and thus dictate
behavior. This new, or secondary personality, has its
own consciousness which has no recollection of the
usual or primary personality and carries out acts inde-
pendent of it .... The disposition and character
possessed by the secondary personality may be quite
different from that shown by the primary personality.
This contrast should naturally be expected since the
secondary personality is made up of material that has
been repressed, that is, has been rejected by the primary
personality because it was not of a nature to be con-
sciously entertained or satisfied." This explanation dis-
proves the apparent assumption of the law that an act
committed in a state of automatism is not attributable
to the actor even in the sense in which acts committed
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applied, although it should be correspondingly
less stringent than in the case of a homicide. In
neither situation should the minimum detention
provisions exclude further extension of measures
upon a finding of continued dangerousness. When
such extension beyond the minimum period is
sought, the nature and gravity of the act com-
mitted should still be an important item of
consideration in determining the issue of danger-
ousness. In all cases other than those in which
minimum measures are applicable, dangerousness
should be an object of proof, rather than auto-
matically inferable from the act. Again, however,
the nature and gravity of the act should be an im-
portant item in determining dangerousness.
The significance of the criminal conduct as an
indicium of dangerousness is gaining increasing
recognition in the District of Columbia when re-
lease of a person acquitted solely by reason of
insanity and automatically assigned to a mental
institution7' is in issue. In estimating "the safety
of the community in case the defendant is re-
leased," courts realize that
"the type of crime which [the subject] committed
must be considered in that connection. For
example, there is less danger to the community
if an embezzler should be released and repeats
the crime of embezzlement than if a murderer
is released and possibly repeats a crime of that
type."7
2
While thus in the recommended scheme the
nature and gravity of the act committed by the
defendant may justify certain minimum measures
and also serve as an indicium of dangerousness
whenever it must be proved, the same act should
also, for constitutional reasons, afford a basis for
the maximum of state intervention in measures,
as well as in punishment. Since the punishment
imposed upon a conduct presumably reflects its
by an insane person are attributable to him. There is
no conceivable reason to differentiate the two situa-
tions. An act committed in a dissociation state is not
psychologically "accidental"; it is rather motivated by
the repressed material of which the secondary per-
sonality is made up.
7' D.C. CoDE ANN. §24-301(3) (Supp. 8 1960). The
terms of unconditional release are "recovery of sanity"
and prognosis that the subject "will not in the reason-
able future be dangerous to himself or others." For con-
struction of this section see Overholser v. Leach, 103
U.S. App. D.C. 289, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959); Isaac v. United
States, 284 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
72 Judge Holtzoff's opinion in Hough v. United
States, quoted in Circuit Judge Miller's dissent in
Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 463, 466 (D.C.
Cir. 1959).
gravity, the maximum of such punishment may be
taken to afford a proper standard for the maximum
in the area of measures. As mentioned before,
regardless of "danger," the maximum length of
detention by way of measures ought to bear a
certain relationship to the maximum period of
punishment that might be imposed upon the
precipitating criminal conduct, if it were a crime.
In felony cases, it is believed that the maximum
detention period ought not exceed the maximum
period of punishment. In instances of misde-
meanors, a corresponding limitation would
frustrate any treatment effort and thus the pre-
ventive purpose of detention. A relative increase
of detention maxima may afford a solution, which
might be constitutionally justified on the ground
of the defendant's choice expressed in his plea of
insanity, as required in misdemeanor cases,7
although one may well argue that such justifica-
tion is dispensable. In instances in which detention
beyond the limits thus set is necessary, civil
commitment proceedings should be instituted.
As seen, in the District of Columbia concern
has been expressed about the problem of the po-
tential bearing of the gravity of the act on the
constitutionality of protracted detentionY4 But
there has been no systematic consideration of
either the scope of the relationship that must
exist between crime gravity and the length of
detention or, generally, between danger and
detention.75 The submission of the writer is that
no man, however dangerous and whatever the
gravity of his act, may be detained indefinitely at
criminal law, and that crime gravity, as objective
determinant, and as one of the indicia of dangerous-
ness, should be taken as a standard of the scope of
permissible detention or of any other measures.
(b) The Mental Element in "Mental Incapacity"
Cases
In our law the state of mind of a person acquitted
on the ground of insanity "at the time of the act"
is not further diversified for the purpose of im-
posing "measures." Once thus acquitted, he is
treated uniformly, except that in some jurisdic-
73 If, as has been recommended earlger'-n the text,
mental incapacity in misdemeanor cases remains an
"affirmative defense," there is very little likelihood that
it will be a frequent issue in crimes on which a small
penalty is imposed.
74 See particularly the thoughtful opinion of Judge
Fahy in Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 949
(D. C. Cir. 1960).
75 Id. at 950.
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tions his "insanity" at the time of acquittal may
be relevant to the issue whether a measure may be
imposed at all. The assumptions underlying this
position are not realistic and should be re-ex-
amined.
Acquittal on the ground of insanity is deemed
in our law to imply that the accused acted without
"intent." 78 As interpreted in Carter v. United
States,7 he lacked the "vicious mind" or "vicious
will" which "motivates a criminal act," and which
it is the "basic import of criminal law" to punish.
-This interpretation is further explained in the
light of "accepted philosophy"- which, it is al-
leged, "has never changed" even in Durham v.
United States -to mean that the ultimate reason
for not punishing a person suffering from a "mental
disease or defect" is that "in doing the act he is not
a free agent, or not making a choice, or unknowing
of the 'difference between ight and wrong, or not
choosing freely, or not acting freely."7 8
However theoretically valid, the metaphysical
"free will doctrine," thus proclaimed to translate
the meaning of the mental incapacity exemption,
is functionally meaningless, since it does not
lend itself to being administered in any specific
context. To be legally meaningful, the "free will"
thesis would have to be operational, that is, useful
in solving practical legal issues, specifically, by
affording a test whereby it might be possible to
determine whether or not a person had acted
"freely." 79 The assumption that the wording of
the Durham formula is the practical corollary of
that thesis is entirely gratuitous.
78 This view, stressed in the New Hampshire cases,
State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870); State v. Jones, 50
N. H. 369 (1871), has also been accepted in Durham
v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862,
876 (1954).
77 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
78 Ibid.79Judge Burger, concurring in the result only in
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 857, 869 (D.C.
Cir. 1961), suggested that if the -meaning of Durham
can be actually translated into "acting knowingly and
freely," the latter criterion should be.placed "squarely
before the jury" rather than hidden from it. Though
this criticism is logically valid, the fact is that neither
the jury nor anyone else could answer the question
whether the defendant "acted freely," since this
question means: "Could he have acted otherwise than
he in fact acted?"
The "free will" test has also been recommended by
Chief Judge Biggs in United States v. Currens, 290
F.2d 751, 774-75 (3d Cir. 1961). Judge Hastie, dis-
senting in part, id. at 776, aptly remarked that "psychi-
atrists may well reject talk of destroying the will as
unscientific imagery." For a critique of the test of "ca-
pacity to conform" see Silving, Mental Incapacity in
Criminal Law, supra note 1, at 47-51, 54-56.
On the other hand, if the phrase "vicious will"
is taken to convey the notion of conduct deviating
grossly from certain ethical standards,80 one might
query why the conduct of a mentally ill person
ought not to be judged by these standards. Such
person can act with as much intensity, brutality,
and conscious disregard for the rights and feelings
of others as a normal person. The answer given to
this query in our law seems to be that a mentally
ill person has no "mind" but is "amens (id est)
sine mente," 8' "without a mind." Having no
mind, he cannot possess a "vicious mind" or
"vicious will," and for this reason he cannot be
blamed for his conduct. The view of psychological
reality expressed in this answer is obsolete, and
the rationale of the mental incapacity exemption
based upon this view is anachronistic.
Dynamic psychiatry has shown that, for ex-
ample, schizophrenic patients "are by no means
completely different from the rest of mankind.
They share in the broad, basic psychodynamically
important characteristics of human living-
anticipatory striving at conscious and uncon-
scious levels toward what is desired and against
what is dreaded .... "8 The thinking and acting
of psychotic persons is not senseless but rather
follows a logic which, however, operates within a
frame of reference different from our own. Thus,
even a psychotic person may possess an "intent"
with regard to the precipitating act. The exemp-
tion from punitive responsibility of the mentally
ill is based on grounds other than absence of
"intent,"" if by "intent" we mean a psychological
80 This, in fact, is the ancient meaning of mens rea.
See 1 RussELL, Ciuas 25 (10th ed.'Tumer 1950).
81 See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616
(D. C. Cir. 1957). There Judge Prettyman noticed,
252 F.2d at 616 n.13 that exculpation is not "only
for the individual who is 'without mind', like a wild
beast." In the text, however, he uses the term in the
following connection: "If a man is 'amens (id eat)
sine mente' in respect to an act to such an extent that
in doing the act he is not a free agent ... ." This seems
to mean (1) that the individual must be "without a
mind with regard to the particular act he is committing"
(query: does "without a mind" mean "without in-
tent?"); (2) that this lack of intent or mind qualifies
him as "unfree." If the first proposition were sustain-
able, it should be sufficient.
82 Whitehorn, Psychodynamic Approach to the Study
of Psychoses, in DYNAMC PsYcmATRY 255, 274 (Alex-
ander & Ross ed. 1952).87Nor is the exemption based on ignorance of law
or lack of consciousness of illegality (criminality), as
is implied in McNaghten's Case, supra, note 3. There
may be instances in which such ignorance is a feature
of the mental impairment, but this is not always the
case.
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reality. The ground of exemption is not that such
persons do not "reason" or "intend" or "feel" but
rather that they "reason" or "intend" or "feel"
in contexts divergent from those of the mental
operations of the majority of the community
members, and that this divergence of contexts
affords a social-political ethical ground for not
applying to them the rules adopted with a view
to the average community members. Only in this
sense is the "intent" of the mentally ill person not
imputable to him punitively. The problem arising
within the law of measures is whether such "in-
tent," found not to be determinative in the puni-
tive scheme, should be deemed relevant so far as
imposition and choice of measures are concerned.
The subject's state of mind with regard to the
precipitating act may be relevant in the law of
measures in two ways: as bearing on the character
of the act and as a symptom of "dangerousness."
The qualification of external conduct as a crime
or as a particular crime type mostly depends on
the accompanying state of mind; apart from
certain states of mind, such as intent or reckless-
ness, a given outward behavior may not be
criminal at all or may constitute but a minor
misdemeanor. If the mental element were to be
deemed wholly irrelevant for purposes of measures,
it would be impossible to give within the law of
measures any weight to the nature and gravity of
the criminal conduct engaged in. For example,
crimes of specific intent would have to be elimi-
nated from consideration, so that burglary and
trespass would be considered as equivalent. Sec-
ondly, mental illness often releases rather than
excludes "intent," and this factor has a clear
bearing on the actor's "dangerousness."
According to a doctrine prevailing in German
and Italian law, in contrast to ours, a person
suffering from mental incapacity may possess a
so-called "natural intent" or act with a so-called
"de facto negligence." 84 Such intent or negligence
does not render him punitively responsible. But
84 The intent of a mentally incapacitated person is
called in Germany "natural intent" (natifrlickher Vor-
satz), in Italy "abnormal will" (volona abnorme);
"de facto negligence" is the author's free translation of
the Italian term "negligenza semplice." For the doctrine
of "natural intent" see MAuRAcH, DraurscHs STRAF-
SEcT, ALLOEMEImER TEi. 206, 288, 338 (2nd ed.
1958). For the Italian doctrine of "volontd abnorme"
and "negligenza sempli'e" see REPORT ON THm DRAFT
OF A Nxw ITAraw PENAL CODE 1949/40 (Rdazione
I, pages 56-58). The draft itself uses the phrase "azione
diretta alla produzione dell'evento" (action directed to
production of the event), art. 75, dealing with criminal
conduct in a state of intoxication.
measures. may be predicated upon its presence.
Thus, assignment to a mental hospital of a person
who committed a criminal act in a state of mental
incapacity has been held to require presence of all
crime elements, including the mental element of
"natural intent"; that is, the actor must have
known what he was doing, e.g., that he was
killing a human being, lacking only an "inner
relationship to the illegality content of the act."85
But when such "intent to kill a human being" is
present, for example, an erroneous assumption,
produced by delusion, of a state of fact in the event
of which the act would have been justified, for
example, by self-defense, does not exclude appli-
cation of measures.86
This civil law concept of "natural intent" re-
flects-perhaps unwittingly-the modem psy-
chiatric view that a mental patient is not "com-
pletely different from the rest of mankind" but
possesses a relevant "mental life," though a dis-
tinctive one. The "natural intent" or "reckless-
ness" with which the subject acted is a proper
item of judicial consideration in establishing the
nature and seriousness of the act, as a symptom
of its "dangerousness," as well as for the direct
purpose of evaluating the actor's "dangerousness."
What bearing such "intent" has on the actor's
dangerousness may be shown by psychiatric
evidence. But contrary to the German rule, ab-
sence of a "natural intent" should not a priori
disqualify an actor for subjection to measures,
particularly assignment to a mental hospital.
"Natural intent" and "defacto negligence" should
be relevant items of consideration for the purpose
of a finding of dangerousness but not a necessary
condition of such finding.
(c) Recurrence and Concurrence of Criminal Con-
duct
Psychoanalytic writers, particularly Glover,
have drawn attention to the high probability of
mental disease evincing from the very fact of
crime repetition.8Y Where the background of crime
repetition is mental disease, the danger of further
criminal activity is high. When the precipitating
crime has been independently found to have been
committed in a state of mental incapacity, former
8 KOHLRAUScE-LANGE, STRAFGESETZBUCH, com-
ments to §59, German Penal Code, A. 1.2 c, at 218;
comments to §42 b, A I 2, at 123 (42d ed. 1959).
88 Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (V. Strafsenat),
July 9,1957,reported in 10 NxuxJususnscx VocHEN-
scmur 1484 (1957).
87 Gnovxn, THE, RooTs OF CzRmu 327-338 (1960).
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crime, though it led to conviction, is also likely
to have been committed in a state of incapacity.
A former- acquittal by reason of mental incapacity
substantiates the probability of a pathological
background of crime repetition and thus of danger.
But it is necessary to stress at the outset that
danger of future criminal activity does not per se
jusfify protective detention, for the crime com-
pulsively repeated may be minor, and it may be
found that treatment with a view to prevention
can be promoted if the person concerned remains
at liberty. A finding of "habitual criminality"""
should not by itself be taken to indicate the
necessity or the length of detention. Whether de-
tention is warranted and, if so, what its maximum
should be depend on the nature and gravity of the
anticipated criminal activity and on the effective-
ness of detention to serve an ultimate protective
purpose. In any event, "recurrence" of criminal
conduct as a symptom of dangerousness and as a
basis for imposition and choice of measures con-
stitutes a major issue in the law of measures.
Another significant problem in the symptomatol-
ogy of dangerousness is "conceptual crime con-
currence," consisting in commission of several
crimes by a single act.
Recurrence of Criminal Conduct. In an address
delivered at the Third International Congress on
Criminology Professor Manuel L6pez-Rey y
Arrojo drew attention to the problem whether in
counting the number of crimes committed by an
offender, those engaged in during minority should
be included. 81 He pointed to the undesirability of
preserving a criminal record of juvenile crimes,
from the standpoint of the rehabilitation of the
juvenile offender. Yet, crimes committed during
minority have a special bearing on the actor's
"dangerousness." Other problems arising in the
treatment of crime recurrence are whether it is
necessary to insist on previous conviction or, in-
deed, on execution of the previous sentence; 90
what importance is to be attributed to repetition
of the same crime type (specificity) in evaluating
881 am using the term "habitual criminality" to
designate repetition of criminal activity by a mentally
ill person, to be treated by measures, as contrasted
with "recidivism," which I am using in the sense of
an exclusively punitive category. See Silving, "Ride
of Law" in Criminal Justice, supra note 6, at 142. For
further discussion of "habitual offenders" see infr,
text at note 97, et seq.
8Se SMAuRY OF PROCEEDINGS (September 12-
18, 1955) 36-37 (British Organizing Committee* 1957).
g Art. 67, Swiss FEDERAL PENAL CoDE, requires
the previous sentence to have been executed.
the probability of future crime; what is the signifi-
cance of the relative degree of gravity of the pert-
inent crimes; what number of previous criminal
activities should be required to warrant qualifica-
tion as a special crime type; and, what sympto-
matic role is to be assigned to previous acquittal
on the ground of mental incapacity.
It is submitted that all these issues ought to
be treated differently in punitive context, that is,
as relevant to the punishment for "recidivism,"
and in the context of measures. No one should be
subject to aggravation of punishment on account
of a crime committed by him during minority or
in a state of mental incapacity or by reason of a
crime for which he was not formally convicted.
But within the scheme of measures distinctive
policy considerations require adoption of different
rules. That an offender repeated a pattern of be-
havior whic he-adopted before reaching majority
should not be deemed an item of "guilt" aggrava-
tion. But, as indicated above, the earlier an of-
fender has begun a criminal career, the more likely
is he to persist in it; juvenile crime, indeed of-
fenses committed during childhood, bear im-
portantly on the probability of future repetition.
For the purpose of administering measures,
juvenile crimes ought to be considered indicia of
"dangerousness." Neither as regards such crimes
nor as regards crimes committed in adult life
should proof in the law of measures be required to
consist of submission of a record or of a showing of
conviction or of sentence execution. But to avoid
unfairness, there ought to be proof of previous
criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt. In
this context, availability of a criminal record is
significant. The argument favoring immediate
destruction of records of juvenile crimes, though
most persuasive in punitive context, does not
apply within the protective scheme in which
punitive "guilt" is not in issue. It may be desirable
to render such records inadmissible at any time in
punitive context but admissible as regards meas-
ures.
As regards "specificity" of the crime pattern,
whatever may be the rule within the punitive
scheme, in the scheme of measures repetition of the
same crime pattern may be taken to bear im-
portantly on "dangerousness." But the definition
of "specificity" in this scheme must be cast in
terms of similarity or relatedness of the profound
"motives" that prompted the several acts, whereas
similarity of outward conduct may be taken only
to be evidence of such similarity or relatedness of
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motivation. Yet, even within the protective
scheme invoking a minor criminal activity in
evidence of a particular dangerousness of a major
crime is dubious. For there is at present no suffi-
cient scientific evidence that a person who has
committed a minor crime is generally likely to
commit a major one in the future or that a person
with a record of a minor and a major crime will
in all probability repeat the latter; in the absence
of such evidence, an inference to that effect would
violate basic standards of "legality." Thus, where
a person has successively committed a minor
larceny and a homicide, it is unwarranted to infer
from the mere presence of the larceny record an
increased homicidal "dangerousness," in the sense
of a greater probability that he will commit
another homicide. But there would seem to be no
objection on grounds of "legality" against as-
suming such person to present an increased danger
of repeating the larceny, since crime repetition per
se is a factor to be considered in evaluating danger-
ousness.
Prior acquittal solely on the ground of mental
incapacity has a significant bearing on prob-
ability of future crime repetition. But in such
cases also the probability of repetition inferred
from such former acquittal alone should be taken
to apply only to equally grave or lesser crimes
under consideration.
(Conceptual) Concurrence of Criminal Conduct.
In addition to successive crime or "recurrence"
of criminal conduct, wrongly designated as an
instance of "crime concurrence," namely, as
"factual (substantive or material) crime concur-
rence" (concorso materiale di reati, concurso real,
concours mat&riel ou reel, Realkonkurrenz), there is
another multiple crime figure called "conceptual
crime concurrence" (concorso ideale, concurso
ideal, concours formel ou idol, Idealkonkurrenz).
It is a most intricate construct, which for present
purposes may be briefly and not quite precisely
defined as commission of several crimes by a
single act.9' Where the precipitating act committed
in a state of mental incapacity constitutes several
crimes, e.g., consists in a single setting of a bomb
which causes the death of several persons or in a
single movement of putting a match to property
which causes the burning of a house and the death
91 The concept of "a single act" is most precarious,
the term "act" being ambiguous. Adoption of a different
basic notion for purposes of definition of "conceptual
crime concurrence!' is hence desirable. I am using the
phrase "a single act" for reasons of space economy.
of a person therein, the question arises whether
this multiplicity of criminal qualification ought
to be taken to bear on the actor's dangerousness.
As stated before, the nature and gravity of the
"criminal act" committed by the person concerned
have an important bearing on his "dangerousness."
These concern both the behavior proper and the
ensuing consequences, even unintended ones. The
consequences of a person's act are hardly ever
accidental, so that even in the absence of foresight
or in the case of inadvertent negligence grave con-
sequences may warrant application of security
measures. Multiple consequences fall within the
category of gravity increase, so that even in the
absence of mens rea, multiplicity of harm may be
taken as a symptom of dangerousness. Of course, a
"natural intent" to produce several consequences
may be highly relevant to the issue of dangerous-
ness. It follows that in evaluating the actor's
dangerousness the court ought to take into account
the fact that by his criminal conduct he fulfilled
the external requisites of one criminal statute
several times or of several criminal statutes, and
that the court may take into consideration the
"natural intent" with which he acted.
(d) Miscellaneous Indicia of "Dangerousness":
Personality Evaluation
The described "indicia of dangerousness" should
not be taken as "required conditions," in the
sense of conditions which must be found to be
cumulatively present to warrant a judgment of
"dangerousness." The "act" requirement con-
stitutes an exception, in the sense that a criminal
"act" must be present in all cases in which a
"measure" is imposed. But this requirement is a
"legality safeguard," as are also the maxima im-
posed upon measures and expressed in terms of
correspondence to maxima of punishment for the
pertinent crime. To the extent that the above
discussed factors are symptoms of "dangerous-
ness" proper, the requiiement of the presence of
any one of them is governed by rules of scientific
rationality. The complex of rules which makes it
the duty of the court to consider some of these
"symptoms" ("the court shall consider") and
authorizes it to consider others ("the court may
consider") is in the nature of a "sentencing guide"
which, though obligatory in the sense of a com-
prehensive scheme, is not obligatory in detail.
The court. "must consider" certain factors and
must find the presence or absence in the case of
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each; but it may adjudge the person concerned
"dangerous" though one or more of these factors
are not present, provided that it must state the
reason why, notwithstanding such absence, it
reached its conclusion. The facultative factors
should function only exceptionally as sole, and as
.a rule as supplementary, grounds of judgment, but
failure even to consider them should not constitute
reversible error. Much depends on the nature of
the particular case. E.g., in a situation of a neurosis
or psychopathy "natural intent" may have a dif-
ferent bearing on dangerousness than it has in cases
of schizophrenia or mental deficiency.
In the light of the unavoidable flexibility of any
guides that may be adopted, expert opinion on
"dangerousness" assumes a decisive importance.
Such opinion should present an overall "per-
sonality evaluation" of the subject, setting forth
the nature and etiology of the mental incapacity
from which he suffers as well as a "prognosis"
and a "recommendation" of appropriate measures.
The "prognosis" ought to state the nature and
degree of the "danger" which the case presents, if
possible in terms of the type or types of crime
which the subject is likely to commit. Alternative
measures and their relative fitness to accomplish
the aim of averting the danger of such crime ought
to be suggested, so as to enable the court to weigh
the degree of freedom deprivation incident to
each alternative against its effectiveness.
(2) Relativity of "Dangerousness"; "Danger-
Adequate Measures'!
It is of the essence of democratic policy-making
to weigh considerations of individual liberty
against those of the efficiency of harm-preventive
measures. This implies diversification of "danger"
depending on the nature of the anticipated harm
and the degree of probability of its occurrence,
and diversification of measures in accordance with
the degree of their relative interference with in-
dividual freedom. The measure to be imposed,
though perhaps not the most effective means of
averting the particular danger, should be appro-
priate, in the light of the balance of the interests
in protection and in freedom, to the nature and
probable degree of the harm that is being antici-
pated. Clearly, protracted confinement of a person
for fear that he may pass checks without adequate
ffnds may not be justified, whereas such confine-
ment of a person likely to kill another may be
fully warranted. The required degree of prob-
ability of harm ought to be in inverse proportion
to the degree of the gravity of harm.
Where the precipitating act is homicide or a
felony against the person, a danger of further
homicide or serious bodily harm may be taken to
be implied in the nature of the precipitating act.
A minimum measure of confinement ought to be
ordered automatically upon proof of such act,
the order stating a finding of dangerousness to be
based on an irrebuttable presumption.Y Confine-
ment beyond such -minimum period ought to be
predicated upon a specific finding, after an ad-
versary hearing, of a certain degree of probability
that the subject will commit further acts of the
type he committed. However, the protective need
in such cases is so great that the required degree
of probability should not be high and that the
burden of .proof should be shifted to the person
concerned. While absolute certainty that such
person will never again commit acts of the type
in which he engaged can never be achieved,93 it
would seem proper to insist on convincing evidence
that he is not substantially more likely to kill in
the foreseeable future than are average community
members. 94 Conditional release in such instances
should be subject to a similar test, except where
the terms of such release, e.g., strict supervision,
are expressly found to afford an adequate sub-
stitute safeguard against harm. A therapeutic
need must not be permitted to offset the interest
in protecting human life. 5 The harshness of such
9 Such finding stating the facts of the "criminal
conduct" and setting forth the presence of dangerous-
ness is necessary as a protection of the subject against
arbitrary disposition. There may be most exceptional
grounds for dispensing with confinement even where
dangerousness would be otherwise irrebuttably pre-
sumed, for example, if it can be shown that the person
concerned is at the time of the order permanently in-
capacitated, so that he cannot conceivably repeat a
crime of violence, e.g., that he is paralyzed. For further
reasons for requiring a hearing, if requested, and an
express finding of "dangerousness" even in cases where
the latter is otherwise irrebuttably presumed see infra,
text at note 134.
"In Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262 F.2d 34, 35 n.1
(D. C. Cir. 1958), it was held that the medical witness"
is not required to "give an absolute guarantee that the
patient will never again be mentally ill or dangerous.
Reasonable foreseeability, based on careful diagnosis
and prognosis by competent persons, is the test."
94The phrase "convincing evidence" is used to
denote more than a preponderance of the evidence.
9 As to this see Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d
458, 462 (D. C. Cir. 1959). Unless adequately super-
vised, a person released conditionally can cause as
much harm as one released unconditionally. If the
purpose of confinement in a mental institution of a
person acquitted solely by reason of insanity is treat-
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requirements is modified by the presence of statu-
tory maxima of criminal law detention.
Where, however, the precipitating act is the
passing of bad checks, the protective scheme need
not be stringent. Confinement of the person con-
cerned in an institution should be permissible
only on the basis of a positive showing by the
prosecution either (a) that the likelihood of repeti-
tion is rather high and that no fair substitute
measure is available which, though it might afford
no similar assurance against relapse as does con-
finement, warrants a fair degree of community
protection; or (b) that there is a fair likelihood of
a relapse and that treatment with a view to pre-
vention can be better secured in confinement.96
Conditional release may be granted on a mere
showing of therapeutic advantage. Risks may be
taken in this instance, where the harm that may
occur is not as irremediable as it is in cases involv-
ing a threat of grave bodily harm.
A personality evaluation may show that, though
the precipitating crime was not violent, a great
likelihood exists that the person concerned will in
future turn to violence. To justify detention or
more protracted detention than may be otherwise
warranted by the nature of the crime committed,
a finding of such likelihood ought to be based upon
specific convincing evidence. In no event should
such finding justify excess over the maximum
period allowed in cases of crimes such as the crime
charged.
The court should have power to order measures
short of confinement, appropriate to the nature
and degree of the harm to be averted. Upon a
showing by the prosecution that the particular
measure is rationally adapted to the type of in-
capacity from which the actor suffers, the court
should be able to order that he submit to psy-
chiatric treatment or to periodic psychiatric
checks or to supervision by a psychiatric social
worker; that his license to possess or carry arms,
to engage in a given profession, occupation, or
trade, or to drive a car be suspended; that he
abstain from engaging in a certain profession,
ment and not prevention of harm to the community,
or if the former purpose overrides the latter, then, by
all means, there ought to be a procedure available to
take the person concerned out of such detention and
transfer him to a different type of detention serving
protective needs.
96 For examples of measures short of confinement
that might be used to avert danger see infra. Measures
of this type are common in penal codes of civil law
countries. In this country they are often imposed as
conditions of probation.
occupation, or trade; that he abstain from fre-
quenting certain places or from maintaining certain
professional or social contacts; that he change his
place of residence; that he make an effort to secure
and maintain a regular occupation; etc.
(3) Special- Categories of the Mentally Incapacitated:
The "Habitual Offender" and tte "Offender
Not Susceptible to Punishment"
(a) The "Habitual Offender"
In the foregoing discussion crime committed
prior to that which gives rise to acquittal by reason
of mental incapacity was viewed as an indicium of
dangerousness. Previous acquittal on the ground
of mental incapacity was said to be a particularly
strong indication of such state. But neither factor
alone ought to lead to a finding that the actor is
a "habitual offender" subject to a special type of
measure. The "habitual offender" has been sug-
gested by the writer to designate an offender
type sui generis, contrasted with the "recidivist."9
"Recidivism" is used by the author as a punitive
category, a special "crime type" upon which an
aggravated punishment is imposed.9 8 "Habitual
criminality" is used in the sense of a pattern of
crime repetition followed by a person suffering
from a mental illness. As stated in a previous
publication,9 it is senseless to inquire whether
a criminal act committed by a mentally ill person
is or is not the "product" of his disease; for every
act of any individual emanates from his total
personality rather than from any single trait,
such as mental disease. In a similar sense, the
problem of habitual criminality should not be
cast in terms of crime repetition "produced" by
disease. Rather, such criminality ought to be de-
fined as a state determined by commission of a
series of criminal acts by a person who in all prob-
ability, as evidenced by the repeated conduct
itself or other symptoms and by a psychiatric
personality evaluation, when committing each or
some of the acts within the series, suffered from a
mental disease, and who is very likely to continue
engaging in criminal conduct against which pro-
tection is needed. Neither the precipitating incident
nor the prior criminal conduct need have led to an
17 On this see Silving, ",Rule of Law" in Criminal
Justice, supra note 6, at 142.98 Discussion of "recidivism" as a punitive category
and its appropriate treatment would exceed the scope
of this paper.
9Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law, supra
note 1, at 63-65, 67-69, 81-82.
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acquittal by reason of mental incompetency; each
or any of thdse acts may have resulted in a con-
viction. Though there has been a conviction for
the precipitating act itself, this does not'render
imposition of a punitive sentence mandatory,
since a finding of mental disease may still be made
in the course of a post-conviction "pre-sentence
invkstigation." In fact, when repetition of the
crime pattern is disclosed after conviction-the
issue of recidivism should not be permitted to be
raised prior to this stage1 0°-, it may lead to a re-
consideration of the prior finding of mental
capacity reached without knowledge of the actor's
previous criminal activities, for such repetition is
itself an important indicium of mental illness.
Often the acts within the habitual criminality
series follow a pattern of minor crime. Persons
bent on commission of such acts, particularly
petty thievery, are, in the words of Norval Morris,
"nuisances rather than serious dangers to
society."' 0' Yet, even in these cases, the constant
repetition of the pattern, because of its impact
on public morale, represents a danger that should
be averted by appropriate measures. Of course,
there is also reincidence in serious crime. There is
hence a particular public interest in a special
device for coping with a phenomenon that, were
it not for the subject's mental incapacity, would
constitute the special crime figure of "recidivism."
It is submitted that the court should declare
the actor a "habitual criminal" where the cir-
cumstances of crime repetition, evidenced by.
either convictions or acquittals by reasori of
mental incapacity, would, had the actor been
punitively responsible, constitute recidivism sub-
ject to punishment aggravation, where it is shown
by competent psychiatric evidence that he suffers
from a mental illness and probably suffered there-
from at the time of some or all of the previous
acts, and where further he is found to be "danger-
ous." This declaration should render him amenable
to a detention maximum corresponding to the
punishment maximum that may be imposed upon
recidivism. In the event of repeated petty crime,
such limitation would frustrate any effort at con-
100 Compare supra, text and note 23; see also Note,
Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and
Other Matters, 70 YALE L. J. 763 (1961), on distinctive
treatment of "recidivism" as a sui generis unit. The
writer believes that recidivism constitutes such unit
for substantive purposes, but this does not necessarily
imply that it must be treated as such procedurally,
where the accused might be prejudiced.
101 MoPaus, op. cit. sapra note 46, at 296.
structive preventive rehabilitation. 'The court
should hence be empowered to extend the measure
beyond such maximum in order to make adequate
treatment possible, but not beyond a certain addi-
tional maximutn period. However, where the
criminal activity habitually engaged in is minor,
detention need not be imposed at all. Other meas-
ures, for instance ambulatory psychiatric treat-
ment or supervised liberty, may be found more
effective for producing a permanent cure and
hence more likely to afford a long-range protec-
tion of society.
Detention in cases of "habitual criminality"
ought to be utilized for treating the offenders.
Release on probation should be available where it
promotes therapy without endangering the com-
munity. Where toward the end of the ultimate
maximum period the psychiatrists in charge of
treatment certify that the person concerned has
not recovered from his mental incapacity and is
still "dangerous," in the sense of being likely to
commit further criminal acts, he should neverthe-
less no longer be detained as a "habitual offender,"
except by way of an emergency measure which
would enable the authorities to pursue and termi-
nate civil commitment proceedings. Where within
the maximum period such psychiatrists certify
that the person concerned is not treatable and the
court so finds, he should be assigned for the rest
of the period to a workhouse or agricultural colony,
with the proviso that toward the end of the maxi-
mum period the same type of proceedings are to
,be instituted as in the case of the "uncured."
It is extremely important that "criminal law
measures," particularly those which deprive a
subject of his personal freedom,* not be unduly
"indeterminate" or, indeed, extend to a period
that bears no proportion whatever to the gravity
of the crimes in issue. The aggravation provided
for cases of "recidivism" permits extension of
confinement proportionate to the gravity and
number of the 'crimes committed by the offender.
The maxima thus permissible and additional
maxima for repeated misdemeanors should suffice
even in cases of mentally ill persons to afford a
reasonable period of treatment with a view to
prevention of recurrence. Where a person's
"dangerousness" cannot be averted by such
"criminal law measures," considerations of public
safety must be judged by general standards
applicable to the mentally ill, whether of the
criminal or the non-criminal type. Unless propor-
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tionality to "crime" is safeguarded even in the
scheme of measures, there is danger that crime
definitions will lose their meaningfulness as
guarantees of "legality."
(b) The "Offender Not Susceptible to Punishinet"
This category, known in Danish law,M desig-
nates there a wastebasket category comprising
102 The principal Danish provision on the mental
incapacity exemption is §16, DANI s CRIMINAL CODE
1930, reading thus:
"Acts committed by persons being irresponsible
owing to insanity or similar conditions or pronounced
mental deficiency are not punishable."
There follows a supplementary provision, §17, reading
as follows:
"(1) If, at the time of committing the punishable
act, the more permanent condition of the perpetrator
involved defective development, or impairment or
disturbance of his mental faculties, including sexual
abnormality, of a nature other than that indicated
in sect. 16 of this Act, the court shall decide, on
the basis of a medical report and all other available
evidence, whether he may be considered susceptible
to punishment.
"(2) If the court is satisfied that the accused is
susceptible to punishment; it may decide that a
penalty involving the deprivation of liberty inflicted
on him shall be served in an institution or division of
an institution intended for such persons. If appro-
priate, the Prison Commission may alter the decision
as to where the penalty of imprisonment shall be
served. If, during the term of imprisonment, it
becomes evident that a continuation of such im-
prisonment will be useless or will be likely seriously
to aggravate the condition of the convicted, then,
at the request of the Director of the Prison Service,
the case shall again be brought before the court which
passed sentence in the last instance. This court shall
decide, on the basis of a medical report, whether the
penalty shall continue to be served or not.
"(3) If a person in respect of whom preventive
measures are taken under sect. 70 of this Act (cf.
subsect. (1) of this section) for an offence committed
by him has committed another offence, and if he is
considered susceptible to punishment for offences
of that nature, then, where the latter offence is of
minor importance in relation to the offence in respect
of which preventive measures are applied, the court
may decide that no penalty shall be imposed."
Section 70(1), referred to above, provides that
"Where an accused is acquitted under sect. 16 of
this Act or where punishment is considered inap-
plicable under sect. 17 of this Act, while having
regard to public safety it is deemed necessary that
other measures be applied to him, the court shall
decide on the nature of such measures."
DANISH CRIMINAL CODE 1930 (Giersing & Grdinhut
transl., Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad 1958). Section 70
and following deal with pertinent measures.
In an answer given by Denmark to an "Inquiry on
the Treatment of Abnormal Offendei in Europe"
conducted by the United Nations, §17 of the Danish
Criminal Code has been interpreted as follows: "Under
section 17 certain abnormal conditions other than those
mentioned in section 16 may justify a sentence to
special treatment in lieu of punishment. It is stipulated,
however, that the condition must .be of a more per-
persons suffering from any borderline mental in-
capacity M The terms used to define this category,
"dislurbance of mental faculties," "abnormality,"
are extremely vague and uncertain.' M They are
interpreted as intentionally formulated in this
manner, so as to allow for judicial policy-making.
This intention is inferred from an interesting
additional provision 05 permitting imprisonment
to be discontinued where it appears in its course
"that a continuation of such imprisonment will
be useless or will be likely seriously to aggravate
the condition of the convicted person." 08 But
contrary to appearances, in administering the
pertinent provisions, courts are said to be guided
more by considerations of public safety than by
those of individual capacity for resocialization
by means of punishment.17 The advantage of
the total scheme, including the cited terms, is
said to lie in the indeterminateness and flexibility
of measures applied to persons found to fall within
the pertinent provisions. 08 But the same scheme
has been criticized as failing to give adequate
consideration to the need for a certain proportion
between the precipitating crime or crimes and
freedom deprivation, necessary "even in the case
of abnormal offenders."' 09
Subject to qualification imposed by the con-
manent nature. Section 17 covers in particular persons
having a low degree of mental deficiency and psycho-
paths; it may also be applied to persons suffering from
severe neurosis or being in a psychically abnormal
condition, e.g., in connexion with the menopause or as
a result of abuse of alcohol or narcotics." 12 INTER-
NAT'L REv. or CRIMINAL PoLicy 3, 4-5 (United Na-
tions St/SOA/Ser. M/12 1957).
13 Even as regards the principal incapacity pro-
vision, §16, the Danish court has a wide discretion.
The basic term of this provision, "irresponsible,"
though historically associated with the notion of "free
will," has been interpreted as at present conveying
merely the idea that mental disease, even a psychosis,
does not per se justify exemption and that applicability
of the latter is ultimately a matter of judicial discretion
reached on policy grounds. See HuRwrrz, op. cit. supra
note 67, at 435-36.
10 On the various meanings of these concepts see
id. at 163.
"0'DANISH CRIMINAL CODE 1930 §17(2), supra
note 102.
106 Flexibility of measures, particularly transfer
from a penitentiary to a special institution and vice
versa, however, applies only if the person concerned
has been classified by the original sentence as falling
within §17. On this see Denmark's answer to the
United Nations "Inquiry," supra note 102, at 88.
107See Huxwirz, op. cit. supra note 67, at 438-39:
Waaben, Introduction to DANISH CRIMINAiL CODE
1930, supra note 102, at 13.
108 Compare note 106, supra.
109 See Denmark's answer to the United Nations
"Inquiry," supra note 102, at 88.
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siderations of this criticism and, generally, of
"legality," the concept of "offenders not sus-
ceptible -to punishment" is heuristic. Of course,
in the writer's view, punishment serves ends other
than deterrence and reformation, to which that
concept is geared in Danish law. Within a "law-
assertive" and "guilt-oriented" punishment
scheme, an offender "not susceptible to punish-
ment," that is, a person who shows considerable
deviation in his response to punishment from the
response to this sanction of the average community
members, is very likely to satisfy the terms of the
recommended mental incapacity exemption and
thus to qualify for measures rather than for
punishment. Within the protective scheme, such
"non-susceptibility to punishment" may warrant
application "bf special types of measures. Two
groups are submitted to be comprised within the
category of "offenders not susceptible to punish-
ment": i. the so-called "non-deterrable offender"
and ii. the offender whose mental condition is
likely to deteriorate as a result of imprisonment.
"Non-Deterrable Offenders." Much energy has
been wasted in the administration of the Durham
rule in determining on a case to case basis whether
or not "psychopaths" or "sociopaths" qualify as
suffering from a "mental disease,"" 0 as if the
name given to the mental condition of such persons
-a condition itself most indeterminate"--were a
matter of scriptural hermeneutics. No such mental
gymnastics are noticeable in Denmark, though
the Danish definition of the pertinent concepts is
just as vague as that of the Durham terms. This is
because Danish courts are given the power to
shape the sanctioning policy as regards persons
initially deemed "susceptible to punishment,"
provided that the pertinent Code section"' has
"' For criticism see Judge Burger's concurring opin-
ion in Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 857
(D. C. Cir. 1961); and see particularly-the searching
analysis of this problem by Chief Judge Biggs in
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 161-63 (3d
Cir. 1961).
M O'Beime v. Overholser, 193 F.. Supp. 652 (D.
D. C. 1961). "Neither the clinical characteristics nor
the clinical limits of these personality maldevelopments
are sharply defined." Noyxs & KOLB, op. cit. supra
note 69, at 545. "The extent to which aggressive-
destructive and other dynamic impulses may be acted
out in sociopathic form before labeling the personality
as pathological is a matter of individual opinion and
not determined by definite criteria. Likewise there are
no flied types determined by cause, dynamic process
or result so that any classification depends upon what
manifestations one wishes to stress." Id. at 548.
"' DANIsH CRrMiNAL CODE 1930 §17, supri note
102.
been found in the original sentence to be applic-
able to them. While in the light of "legality"
demands the vagueness of the Danish operational
terms is as dubious as is that of the Durham terms,
there is considerable merit in the availability in
Danish law of a variety of methods for dealing
with the psychopathic offender. Such offender may
be initially treated either punitively or by special
measures, and even in the course of sentence
execution it is possible to reevaluate his response
to a given method and adjust his treatment in
accordance with new findings. The Danish special
institutions for psychopaths, in which new treat-
ment techniques are being developed for this
group of "untreatable" persons, are looked upon
as models in other countries."'
It is possible to combine abidance by legality
principles with provision for a distinctive treat-
ment of particular offender groups. When a psy-
chopath has qualified for exemption from punitive
responsibility by reason of mental incapacity, he
need not be assigned to a general mental institu-
tion. Evaluation in the Psychiatric and Sociologic
Examination Center should include a treatment
proposal. In the case of a psychopath such pro-
posal may indicate the desirability of assignment
to a special institution for psychopaths patterned
after the Danish model. In the event that a person
has been convicted and thus not adjudged to have
committed the crime in a state of mental in-
capacity, it may still be possible to transfer him
to such special institution upon a finding that he
is not "susceptible to punishment," in the sense
of not being susceptible to motivation by pupish-
ment or by imprisonment in institutions designed
for the general class of offenders, for this feature
may be taken to constitute "mental incapacity"
for the purpose of execution. Such mental in-
capacity should be defined with a view to the
purposes of execution.
Offenders Whose Mental Condition Is Likely To
Deteriorate as a Result of Punishment. The second
group of offenders "not susceptible to punishment"
consists of persons whose illness, by contrast to
that of the first group, lies in an excessive con-
science. In psychoanalytic literature this group is
designated as "criminals from a sense of guilt."' 4
Far from being deterred by a threat of punish-
' See DarAF OF A GExmsA PEALa CODE, 1960,
op. cit. supra note 49, §82 (2), and comment at 200-
201.




ment, such persons commit crime precisely be-
cause they unconsciously desire to be punished.
Psychoanalysts have accordingly pointed out that
punishing such persons aggravates rather than
improves their condition. However, there is no
need for a special provision for this group of
persons, since within the definition of "mental
incapacity" that has been recommended, they will
probably qualify for measures rather than for
punishment. The appropriate measure to be ap-
plied must depend on the seriousness of the crime
in issue and, within the limits imposed by reason
of the nature of such crime, on protective and
therapeutic needs.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDUnRAL PROBLEMS
In Ragsdale v. Overholser1 5 the petitioner con-
tended that the District of Columbia provisions
for automatic assignment of a person acquitted
solely on the ground of insanity'1 are unconstitu-
tional, since such acquittal requires merely reason-
able doubt as to sanity, whereas in a habeas corpus
proceeding for release the petitioner is required to
prove that he is not "dangerous to himself or to
others." This contention raised an issue of con-
siderable significance, but its disposition in deci-
sional law is not satisfactory. In fact, the total
area of our procedural "law of insanity" is marked
by a lack of consistent policy orientation, which is
bound to have serious constitutional law implica-
tions.
First, there is no agreement among the judges
on the purpose of the mandatory automatic de-
tention. Judge Burger has stated that such de-
tention pursues two purposes: "(1) to protect the
public and the subject; (2) to afford a place and a
procedure to rehabilitate and restore the sub-
ject ... ."1 Judge Fahy has rather stressed "the
necessity for treatment of the mental condition
1 281 F.2d 943 (D. C. Cir. 1960).
"16 Supra note 43. The wording of the majority view
in Starr v. United States, 264 F.2d 377, 382-83 (D. C.
Cir. 1958), may be taken to mean that the individual
could be released if he showed that he no longer suffered
from an "abnormal mental condition." For such reading
of the majority view see Judge Bazelon's dissent, id.,
383, at 384; also Krash, supra note 28, at 946. The
situation visualized in this instance, namely, that a
person whose mental disease has "caused" the criminal
act subsequently recovers his mental health and yet
F reserves his dangerousness, sheds doubt on the "but
or" factor in the original causation.
17 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 947 (D. C.
Cir. 1960).
which led to acquittal.""" In Overholser v. Russelu9
Judge Bazelon pointed out that detention being
"invoked only in connection with criminal
proceedings, its reach must be limited to the
purpose of criminal law. Clearly, the needs of
such purpose do not encompass the confinement
of those who are not dangerous."'1°
Second, there is no dear notion of the type and
degree of danger against which the protective
measure of continued detention in a mental hospi-
tal may be used. Ii the per curiam opinion in
Russell it was said that danger of commission of
"any criminal act" is a sufficient ground for deny-
ing release;"' but, as pointed out by Judge Bazelon,
this issue remains open since it was not raised by
the record and need not have been considered. It
is also uncertain that the "danger" must be one
of crime commission, for apparently suicide, which
is not a crime, is induded in the term "danger-
ous to himself.' '1"
Third, there is no agreement on the degree of
proof imposed upon the petitioner in habeas corpus
proceedings for release. In Ragsdale Judge Burger
thought that there must beproof "beyond a reason-
able doubt,"123 but Judge Fahy demands merely
that "on the evidence and in the circumstances as
a whole the District Court should be able to reach
a sound judgment one way or the other on the
question of release."
' ' 4
Fourth, no satisfactory explanation is offered of
wherein exactly consists the "rational relationship
between mandatory commitment ... and acquittal
by reason of insanity,""15 upon which all the judges
insist. This relationship apparently justifies classi-
fication of a person thus acquitted as a member of
"an exceptional class of people,"' S assumed to be
18 Judge Fahy's concurring opinion, id., 949, 950.
119 283 F.2d 195 (D. C. Cir. 1960).
120 Judge Bazelon, concurring in the result only,
id., 198, 199.
121 The court said, id. at 198: "[T~he danger to the
public need not be possible physical violence. It is
enough if there is competent evidence that he may
commit any criminal act, for any such act will injure
others and will expose the person to arrest, trial and
conviction."
m This is not all. The court also pointed out that
there "is always the additional possible danger not to
be discounted even if remote-that a non-violent
criminal act may expose the perpetrator to violent
retaliatory acts by the victim of the crime." Ibid.
"3281 F.2d 943, 947 (D. C. Cir. 1960).
124 Cited by Judge Bazelon in Overholser v. Russell,
283 F.2d 195, 199 (D. C. Cir. 1960).
2'Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 947-48,
950 (D. C. .Cir. 1960).
2 Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 669-70 (D. C.
Cir. 1958).
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at least prima facie mentally ill and dangerous,
although "the standards and tests for (1) ex-
culpation from criminal responsibility . . . and
(3) release from hospital custody" are "separate
and distinct."m Judges concerned with the con-
stitutionality issue advance the view that in the
area of constitutional doubt a reasonably prompt
shifting to civil commitment proceedings affords
the proper solutionmns But it is rather dubious
that the lack of proper legality safeguards in the
original criminal law confinement, or failure to
assure a realistic positive substantive relationship
between the nature and degree of the danger and
imposition of confinement, can be justified by
the mere fact that such confinement may be soon
replaced by commitment proceedings.
To afford a rational relationship between ends
and means, systematization is necessary. This
can be afforded only in a planned statutory
scheme which reflects a consistent policy giving
due comparative weight to public and individual
interests. Such systematization must proceed
from a diversified notion of "danger" and a dis-
cerning scheme of relative "danger-response,"
and must assign to each "danger-situation," de-
pending on its nature and degree, a "danger-ade-
quate" measure. Such coordination of measures
and protective needs must be safeguarded by a
strict scheme of procedural guarantees of due
process.
As pointed out by Judge Fahy, the seriousness
of the precipitating crime is an extremely signifi-
cant item of consideration in determining whether
a measure of freedom deprivation is constitu-
tional1 9 Judge Fahy was concerned with con-
tinuation of a measure which he thought could
be properly continued merely because of the acquit-
tal by reason of insanity. But even the initial
imposition of the measure may be highly dubious
where the crime in issue is minor, though the
same doubt can be readily dismissed where the
.person concerned has demonstrated his serious
dangerousness by committing a felony against the
person, though in a state of mental incapacity. 1n
Id. at 670 n.4.
M See Judge Fahy's opinion in Ragsdale v. Over-
holser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D. C. Cir. 1960); and see
Judge Bazelon's opinion in Overholser v. Russell,
283 F.2d 195, 199 (D. C. Cir. 1960).
129 Ragsdale v. Overholser, supra note 128, at 950-51.
10 In Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 394,
396-97 (D. C. Cir.), appeal pending, 366 U. S. 958(1961), Judge Fahy, dissenting. expressed the view
that the release procedures for persons acquitted solely
on the ground of insanity in the District of Columbia
Even where the precipitating act is grave, the
evidentiary situation is apt to arouse serious pre-
occupation. It has been stressed that "[i]nherent
in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
are two important elements, (a) that the defendant
did in fact commit the criminal act charged, (b)
that there exists some rational basis for belief
that the defendant suffered from a mental disease
or defect of which the criminal act is a product."In
Presumably, theh, the jury ought to be instructed
that unless they find proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the act
charged they cannot acquit solely by reason of
insanity. But when presented with the alternative
of acquittal on the ground of insanity, will the
jury take the requirement of proof of commission
of the act charged "beyond a reasonable doubt"
as seriously as it would were such proof to result
in a conviction?
Since "dangerousness" is not an element of the
"'insanity test," it would seem that acquittal by
reason of insanity does not imply even prima facie
a need for detention. "Dangerousness" rather
evinces from the commission of the act charged.
Such "dangerousness" varies in nature and degree
depending on that act. Certain types of acts war-
rant detention, while others do not, either because
measures short of detention may suffice, to avert
the danger or because the anticipated harm is
small, so that the defendant's interest in liberty
outweighs the public interest in protection. More-
over, the symptomatic value of the commission
of a criminal act may be substantially affected by
the surrounding circumstances. Given certain
conditions, the inference that the actor is likely
to commit a similar act in the future is not very
strong. In such cases, it depends on the gravity of
the harm feared whether or not taking a risk is
constitutionally required. Detention of a person
on the basis of a small probability of serious
harm may be justified, whereas detention on the
were not intended by Congress to apply to "persons
who have engaged in any kind of conduct, however
minor. but only [to] persons who have engaged in
unlawful conduct of a dangerous character," par-
ticularlv crimes of violence. But it is somewhat puzzling
that Judge Fahy does not at the same time object to
the provision for the automatic assignment of such
minor offenders to a mental institution, rather assuming
that they are sufficiently protected by means of habeas
corpus proceedings. The basis of the writ in such cases
would seem to be the illegality of the original detention.
Is a statute constitutional that provides for a detention
that is ab initio illegal?
131 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 948 (D. C.
Cir. 1960).
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basis of a small probability of moderate harm may
be constitutionally improper.
The injustice implicit in an initial imposition of
detention subject to later release upon habeas
corpus petition is magnified by the shifting of the
burden of proof to the petitioner. Additionally,
the degree of proof which some judges believe
the petitioner must meet, namely, proof "beyond
a reasonable doubt," is impossible to meet in
matters involving mental life, and particularly
where prognosis is in issue. Again, shifting the
burden of proof to the petitioner may be justified
in some situations but not in others. Where crimes
endangering human life and health are involved,
such shifting of the burden of proof may be war-
ranted, but where crimes other than these are
anticipated, it is extremely objectionable. Who-
ever has the burden of proof cannot be expected
to adduce more than convincing proof.
If measures applied to persons acquitted by
reason of mental incapacity are to be deemed
constitutional, certain basic requirements must
be fulfilled. It is important to keep in mind that,
though not "punitive," such measures are
"penal."13 No purpose other than protection
against a danger of future crime commission by
the defendant must be the ultimate object of such
measures. This means that averting suicide or a
threat of provocation of crime of third persons'3 is
not a proper object of criminal law detention,
except in the form of an emergency measure to be
replaced without delay by appropriate means of
civil protection.
Although the criminal act charged is of such
nature and gravity as to give rise to an irrebut-
table presumption of dangerousness justifying
detention, a hearing should be granted upon de-
fendant's request on the issue of the imposition of
measures. In such hearing it should be possible to
challenge the court's choice of the place of de-
tention, or the finding of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of the commission of the criminal act
adduced during trial. A formal finding of "danger-
ousness" should be required even where dangerous-
ness is irrebuttably presumed by virtue of the act
committed, the court stating the basis of the
finding and its evaluation of the evidence at the
haring, if any. As mentioned before, an irrebut-
table presumption of dangerousness should obtain
where the precipitating act would but for the
I See Silving, "Rule of Lau" in Criminal Justice,
supra note 6, at 145.
13 See note 122, supra.
defendant's mental incapacity be a felony against
the person; commission of such act is believed to
warrant detention for a minimum period, varying
in length depending on whether the act is a
homicide or another felony. The presumption of
dangerousness in such cases ought to be rebuttable
only if a very long time has elapsed since commis-
sion of the act,U and in such event a hearing
should be required. Where a felony against the
person is not involved, there ought to be a hearing
in which the prosecution must prove dangerous-
ness. If the prosecution succeeds in establishing,
for example, on the basis of the defendant's
antecedents, that he is likely to turn to crimes of
violence, confinement may be warranted. It may
likewise be warranted where the prosecution
shows that there is danger of other serious crime
commission and that no measure short of detention
can avert it. Any measure other than detention
must also be proved by the prosecution to be ap-
propriate to avert the type of danger threatened.
In no case should more than convincing proof be
required where prediction of future human conduct
is in issue. In all cases in which dangerousness or
choice of an appropriate measure is in issue, psy-
chiatric testimony ought to be mandatory.
Before lapse of the minimum period of detention
in cases of felonies against the person an ad-
versary hearing ought to be held regarding ex-
tension or termination of the measure. In this
hearing the presumption of dangerousness ought
to be rebuttable by appropriate evidence. Provi-
siofis ought to be made for mandatory periodic
examinations of the issue of continued dangerous-
ness, both in cases involving crimes against the
person after lapse of the minimum detention
period and in those involving other crimes as
well as measures other than detention.
III. CONCLUSION
In legal fields other than the criminal law the
method of "trial and error" characteristic of the
common law has produced results which, on the
whole, should not evoke particular concern.
Although it is not always dear against what
"truth" error is tested, different individuals may
"' In Italian law dangerousness is required to be
specifically established by the judge in a formal finding
even where it is presumed by law from frequent crime
repetition, if the conviction or acquittal by reason of
insanity is pronounced after ten years since the day of
crime commission in cases involving mentally diseased
defendants. ITALIAN PENAL CODE art. 204, para. 2, no. 1.
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well find it possible to reconcile these results with
their divergent "truth" concepts. But in the area
of criminal law this method is highly objection-
able, inasmuch as criminal law is authoritarian
law par excellence, where "man rules over another
to the latter's hurt."1 35 "Error" is "tested" at the
expense of the subject's most vital interest, his
personal freedom. "Trial" at such cost is immoral.
Rather, there ought to be a dear policy estab-
lished in advance, setting forth the legitimate
objectives of law in a differential discriminatory
u 1 Ecd. 8: 9.
manner. There must be no freedom deprivation at
all unless it is warranted then and there by a
legitimate purpose. Nor must there be deprivation
in excess of that justified by the particular purpose
and the social needs as pertaining to the type of
situation involved. Abuse cannot be justified
just because it is "remediable," particularly when
the person concerned has been found to suffer or
to have suffered from a mental incapacity, for
such person can hardly be expected to possess
those mental qualities upon which effective
pursuit of available legal remedies is predicated.
